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I. INTRODUCTION 
The idea for a personnel parachute can be traced all the way back to Leonardo da 
Vinci in the 15th century, but not until World War I (WWI) were personnel parachutes 
used during military operations (Johnson, 1990). Personnel in observation balloons used 
parachutes as a way of escaping their gas-filled balloons if they caught on fire. German 
aviators also utilized parachutes to escape their damaged planes (Weeks, 1976). Toward 
the end of WWI, the United States (U.S.) began developing and fielding their first 
parachutes to American pilots. In 1918, the commander of the United States Army Air 
Corps in France, Colonel W. “Billy” Mitchell, introduced the idea of using planes to 
transport troops over obstacles and inserting them behind enemy lines to overcome the 
“deadlock of positional war” experienced in WWI with trench warfare (Weeks & 
Batchelor, 1982). U.S. military leaders did not begin to seriously develop the strategic 
concept of airborne operations posed by Colonel Mitchell until World War II (WWII). 
Beginning in 1940, the U.S. Army Air Corps established the Airborne Test Platoon, the 
501st Parachute Infantry Battalion (PIB), and modified the Army Air Corps parachute 
into the first troop parachute known as the T-4 (Weeks, 1976). 
 Following the modification of the Army Air Corps parachute, the U.S. Military 
has developed and fielded five troop parachutes; in 2014, the T-11 Advanced Tactical 
Parachute System (ATPS) became the most recent parachute to be fully fielded to Army 
Airborne units. Since its fielding, the T-11 ATPS has been the subject of investigation 
involving the deaths of nine paratroopers, causing several senior military officials to 
question its safety and design. As a Program of Record (POR), the T-11 ATPS underwent 
multiple developmental and operational test events. These test events identified six areas 
of concern, two of which were accepted by the combat developer (U.S. Army Evaluation 
Center, 2009). 
Additional tests and studies were commissioned following the fielding of the 
ATPS to examine its safety and design in operational use. The results of these tests and 
studies concluded that the T-11 parachute has a reduced rate of paratrooper jump related 
injuries that is 43% less than that of the legacy T-10 parachute (Knapik et al., 2014). 
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Despite the findings of the previous studies and tests, Lieutenant General (LTG) 
Joseph Anderson (2015), the commanding general (CG) of the XVIII Airborne Corps, 
authored a memorandum to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA), titled Request 
to Assess and Modernize the T-11 Advanced Tactical Parachute System, which identified 
seven areas of concern (Table 8). These areas of concern were later modified and 
prioritized into a list of eight issues (Figure 9) by the Army Airborne Board Joint 
Working Group (Army Airborne Board, 2016). As the Product Manager Soldier Clothing 
and Individual Equipment (PdM SCIE) and the Training and Doctrine (TRADOC) 
Capabilities Manager (TCM), Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCOE), continue to 
address the concerns of the warfighter and develop future troop parachutes, this report 
presents an analysis of the options to consider for the program to move forward to meet 
warfighter and user requirements, while balancing cost and schedule constraints.  
A. PURPOSE OF PROJECT 
The purpose of this report is to compare potential acquisition approaches to 
include incremental upgrade approach, a new design and development approach also 
known as a single step approach, a non-materiel approach, or a possible combination of 
these approaches to provide the Army with a recommended path forward for the T-11 
ATPS. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Question 
What is the best path forward for the U.S. Army’s T-11 Advanced Tactical 
Parachute System (ATPS) to provide the most effective troop parachute system for use in 
military airborne operations?  
2. Secondary Questions 
1. What are the existing concerns regarding the T-11 ATPS?  
2. What capability requirements governed the development, testing, and 
fielding of the T-11 ATPS? 
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3. What alternative acquisition approaches are available to address T-11 
issues? 
4. What are the advantages and disadvantages of various acquisition 
approaches? 
C. BENEFITS OF THE RESEARCH 
The results of this report will inform the Army of the advantages and 
disadvantages of employing different acquisition approaches when attempting to address 
warfighter concerns regarding a product, in a post-fielding environment. This report helps 
develop courses of action to consider, enabling acquisition professionals to choose the 
best acquisition approach, thus maximizing their program’s efficiency and productivity 
(Kendall, 2013). 
D. LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
This research report is limited by the T-11 data received from the PdM SCIE, 
TRADOC Capabilities Manager (TCM), and the Natick Soldier Research Development 
and Engineering Center (NSRDEC), and the user and other documentation gathered 
through public and unclassified online government search engines. 
E. SCOPE OF METHODOLOGY 
The scope of methodology for this report consists of three steps: 1) data 
collection, 2) identification of advantages and disadvantages, and 3) comparative 
analysis. The first step gathers data from various stakeholders within the airborne 
community on the T-11 ATPS. Data was obtained through telephone interviews, 
published articles, manuals, and unpublished documents. The second step identifies the 
advantages and disadvantages of possible acquisition approaches from each stakeholder’s 
perspective and the Department of Defense (DOD) Decision Support Systems lens. The 
final step compares the advantages and disadvantages of each approach in terms of cost, 
schedule, performance and risk to inform the recommendation. 
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F. ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT 
Following the Introduction chapter, Chapter II provides a brief background of 
Army airborne operations and the evolution of U.S. troop parachutes, with an emphasis 
on the T-11 ATPS. Chapter III provides a discussion of several studies conducted on 
parachute-related injuries and identifies the main concerns of the T-11 ATPS 
stakeholders and what steps have been taken to address them. Chapter IV provides the 
research methodology, which covers how data is gathered and a description of the 
analysis tools that are used in the analysis presented in Chapter V. Finally, Chapter VI 
provides the conclusion, recommendations for a path forward, and areas for further 
research.  
G. SUMMARY 
A product manager’s (PdM) goal and responsibility is to provide the warfighter 
with a materiel solution that meets approved performance requirements, is within budget, 
and is on schedule, with minimal acceptable risk. Once a product is fielded, the 
warfighter may discover issues that must be addressed by the PdM, whether those issues 
are perceived or actual. Providing solutions to these issues post fielding is an extremely 
difficult task for a PdM to accomplish with the DOD’s acquisition framework. 
Identifying possible solutions and conducting a thorough analysis of those possible 
solutions that consider each stakeholder’s perspective, while adhering to DOD 





Arguably the most important piece of equipment in a paratrooper’s arsenal is the 
parachute. Over a short span of 76 years, the troop parachute has advanced tremendously 
in response to evolving changes in military air transport, airborne concepts, tactics, and 
procedures. This chapter discusses the history of airborne operations since its inception, 
along with the progress made in the development of tactical personnel parachutes. 
Additionally, a thorough background of the current, most advanced, non-steerable tactical 
troop parachute is presented.  
B. AIRBORNE OPERATIONS 
U.S. airborne operations have a relatively short history considering the age of the 
nation’s military. Weeks & Batchelor (1982) described the concept of airborne operations 
that was first introduced by Col. W. “Billy” Mitchell in 1918. Mitchell suggested that 
militaries could use multiple aircraft to transport paratroopers around geographic 
obstacles to an objective behind enemy lines to “overcome the deadlock” of WWI trench 
warfare (Weeks & Batchelor, 1982). While this concept was born in 1918, its 
implementation by the United States was another 25 years in the making. Enthralled by 
Germany’s use of paratroopers during the 1930s, along with the beginning of WWII in 
1939, the previously discussed airborne operations concept of “vertical envelopment” 
was reinvigorated (DeVore, 2004). This involved the creation of the all-volunteer 
Airborne Test Platoon in 1940, and subsequently the 501st Parachute Infantry Battalion 
(PIB). The United States continued to expand their airborne force despite a lack of 
doctrine. From 1940 to 1941, the U.S. created regiments followed by divisions. In 1942, 
the United States established the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions (Weeks, 1976).  
With the establishment and expansion of the nation’s airborne force, the United 
States War Department published its first doctrinal publication on airborne operations in 
1942, called the Tactics and Technique of Air-Borne Troops (FM 31–30). This manual 
became a guide to planners, leaders, and paratroopers within the airborne units. It 
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described airborne operations as the transport of a small group of troops by aircraft to an 
objective, in which the paratroopers landed via parachutes to perform any number of 
missions in austere areas not immediately accessible. This early doctrine also listed 
several missions of airborne operations, including the following:  
 seize and secure terrain until follow on aircraft and troops can 
reach the area, river and canal crossings, key terrain behind enemy 
defenses  
 establish bridgeheads  
 attack defended positions in the enemy’s rear and flank 
 seize and destroy lines of communications (LOC) 
 vertical envelopment 
 act as a diversion to operations of main forces. (United States War 
Department, 1942) 
Limited not only by their objectives, airborne operations were also significantly 
limited by the availability and type of aircraft provided by the Troop Carrier Command 
(TCC), weather conditions, and the training level of paratroopers and aircraft pilots. 
Following the first combat airborne operation in 1942 in North Africa, leaders like Lt. 
Col. James M. Gavin noticed that for airborne forces to achieve maximum effectiveness, 
the initial assault must be conducted in mass, in the smallest possible area, within the 
shortest amount of time possible (Bilstein, 1998). Although the FM 31–30 was published 
before the airborne force’s first combat airborne operation, it has remained valid in terms 
of characteristics, limitations, capabilities, and missions performed by paratroopers, with 
a few exceptions. Current doctrine has been updated to reflect changes in aircraft type, 
speed and range, increasing weight of equipment carried on the paratrooper, and new 
missions such as rapid deployment, humanitarian, and special operations (United States 
Department of the Army, 2015). The new missions noted earlier were required as the 
operational environment changed toward the end of WWII. Most notable was the 
implementation of special operations and their use of two new parachuting techniques, 
high-altitude high-opening (HAHO) and high-altitude low-opening (HALO). First used 
by the U.S. military in Vietnam in the 1960s, HAHO jumps involve parachutists jumping 
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from an aircraft at approximately 30,000 feet above ground level (AGL), with oxygen, 
and then deploying their parachute immediately following their exit. They then maneuver 
their parachute across miles of terrain to their objective. HALO jumps are the other type 
of jump used by special operations forces. These jumps require parachutists to jump from 
a high altitude, with oxygen, then free fall until reaching about 4,000 feet AGL, where 
they deploy their parachute (Murphy, 2015). 
From the initial concept of military airborne operations, U.S. leaders have 
vigorously debated the cost and effectiveness of airborne operations. While airborne 
forces experienced a few successful operations during WWII, most of the operations 
were extremely disappointing, leaving continued doubt in the minds of the decision-
makers. Mass-tactical airborne operations are few and far between since WWII, with the 
latest occurring in 2003 by the 173rd Airborne Brigade in northern Iraq (DeVore, 2004). 
Most current airborne operations involving personnel airdrops, are conducted by the 
special operations community, leading many to question the relevance of conventional 
airborne forces, especially in a time of fiscal constraint and uncertain budgets. Table 1 
shows the major combat operations since WWII utilizing mass tactical parachute 
operations. 
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Table 1.   Mass Tactical Parachute Operations. Adapted from Pike (2013). 
 
 
C. MANEUVERABLE AND NON-MANEUVERABLE PARACHUTES 
A variety of missions utilize airborne operations to accomplish their objectives. 
Each mission is unique and requires determining the type and quantity of the force, the 
parachute drop technique, and the personnel equipment necessary to accomplish the 
Date Unit Operation Troop Strength Dropzone
Parachute 
Type Country Type Air Delivery / Notes
October 20, 1950
2nd Battalion, 187th 
Airborne Regimental 
Combat Team (ARCT)
1,203 DZ Easy, Sukchon T-7 Korea
Day Mass low-level tactical personnel static-
line jump, platform heavy drop gun jeeps, 
105mm artillery pieces
October 20, 1950
1st and 3rd Battalions, 
187th Airborne Regimental 
Combat Team (ARCT)
1,470 DZ William, Sukchon T-7 Korea
Day Mass low-level tactical personnel static-
line jump, platform heavy drop gun jeeps, 
105mm artillery pieces
March 23, 1951
187th ARCT: 2nd and 3rd 
Battalions; 674th Airborne 
Field Artillery Battalion; 2nd 
and 4th Ranger Companies; 
Indian army surgical team.
Tomahawk 3,486 Munsan-Ni T-7 Korea
Day Mass low-level tactical personnel static-
line jump, platform heavy drop gun jeeps, 
105mm howitzers
February 22, 1967
173rd Airborne Brigade 
(Separate): 2nd and 3rd 
Battalions (Airborne), 503rd 
Infantry; 3rd Battalion 
(Airborne), 319th Field 
Artillery
Junction City 845 Katum T-10 South Vietnam
Day Mass low-level tactical personnel static-
line jump Equipment/supplies air-delivered: 
Gun MULEs (M274s), 105mm artillery pieces. 
Jumped at 0900 hours on 22 February 1967.
October 25, 1983
1st and 2nd Battalions, 75th 
Infantry Regiment; Det, 







Day mass low-level tactical personnel static-
line jump Sgt. Spain and SPC Richardson of 
the 618th Engineer Company accompanied 
the Rangers
December 20, 1989
Task Force Red: Elements, 
75th Ranger Regiment; 




east to Fort 
Cimarron
T-10/MC1 Panama
Night mass low-level tactical personnel static-
line jump at 0100 hours, platform heavy drop 
LVAD, CDS LVAD Ranger M151 Gun jeeps, 
HMMWVs, Ammo, Food (MREs), water 
(CDS). Task Force Red consisted of 1,300 
troops and the 82nd Airborne Division's 
Division Ready Brigade consisted of 2,700 
troops
December 20, 1989
Task Force Pacific: 
Elements, 75th Ranger 
Regiment; 1st Brigade Task 
Force, 82nd Airborne 
Division: 1-504th Infantry; 1-
505th Infantry; 2-504th 
Infantry; C/4-325th Infantry; 
A/3-505th Infantry; 3-73rd 







Night mass low-level tactical personnel static-
line jump, platform heavy drop LVAD, CDS 
LVAD Equipment/supplies air-delivered: M551 
Sheridan light tanks, Ranger M151 Gun 
jeeps, HMMWVs, Ammo, Food (MREs), 
water (CDS); Elements of the 75th Ranger 
Regiment jumped at 0124 hours, followed by 
the 1st Brigade Task Force, 82nd Airborne 
Division at 0145 hours. Task Force Pacific 
formed up on the ground by 0411 hours
March 26, 2003
Task Force Viking / 
Combined Joint Special 
Operations Task Force - 
North: Det, 2nd Battalion, 
10th Special Forces Group; 
HHC, 173rd Airborne 
Brigade; Det, 74th Infantry 
Platoon; 173rd Support 
Company, 250th Medical 
Detachment, D-319th Field 
Artillery; 501st Support 
Company; 2-503rd Infantry; 








Drop zone T-10/MC1 Iraq
Later classified as a combat jump, even 
though the objective was a coalition-held 
forward operating airfield.
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mission. The changes noted in the previous paragraph led to the development and fielding 
of different types of parachutes. These parachutes can be placed in two general categories, 
steerable and non-steerable. Steerable parachutes allow highly trained parachutists to 
control their descent through toggles. These toggles allow the parachutist to control the 
direction of travel and turning action of the parachute. Additionally, some round parachute 
designs provide a steering capability by cutting large holes in the edges of the parachute 
(Botans, 2014). Special operations missions typically utilize steerable parachutes, using 
small numbers of specially trained troops to conduct precision air drops where pinpoint 
landings are mandatory. The U.S. military currently utilizes at least two types of steerable 
parachutes, the Ram-Air Parachute System (RA-1) and the MC-6 parachutes. The RA-1, as 
seen in Figure 1, has a rectangular canopy and is used for high-altitude drops allowing the 
paratrooper to land within a 25–30-meter circle (McGarry, 2013). The RA-1 can be 
deployed by static line, ripcord or throw out techniques. The reserve parachute system also 
contains an automatic opening device (AOD) that uses barometric pressure sensors and 
accelerometers to measure a parachutists’ descent rate (Natick, 2002). The AOD deploys 
the reserve if the device detects that the paratrooper is descending to a certain altitude at a 
speed higher than the average ROD of the main parachute canopy. The MC-6 is a 
polyconic shaped parachute that allows a paratrooper to land on drop zones at higher 




Figure 1.  RA-1 Parachute. Source: McGarry (2013). 
Used for mass-tactical parachute operations, steerable and non-steerable 
parachutes are deployed by a static line. Conventional airborne forces such as the 75th 
Ranger Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division, and 173rd Airborne Brigade rely on a 
combination of steerable and non-steerable parachutes to place a large number of 
paratroopers on a drop zone, massing their forces on an objective, as fast as possible. 
Parachutists utilizing non-steerable type parachutes cannot maneuver the parachute 
toward an intended direction; they simply glide in the direction of the wind and use the 
risers to slip or avoid obstacles. The minimum jump altitude for this type of parachute is 
approximately 550 feet AGL from a C-130 aircraft and 525 feet from a C-17 aircraft, 
allowing for the safe opening of the parachute and arrival of the paratrooper on the 
ground as fast as possible (U.S. Army Developmental Test Command, 2009). There is 
only one (1) non-steerable parachute in the U.S. Army’s inventory, the T-11 Advanced 
Tactical Parachute System (ATPS). The T-11’s modified cross/cruciform shape utilizes a 
slider to control the opening sequence of the canopy, resulting in a decreased opening 
shock for the paratrooper.  
Both the steerable MC-6 and the non-steerable T-11 ATPS consist of three weeks 
of training at the Basic Airborne Course (BAC) in Fort Benning, GA. During the training, 
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the students learn proper jump and landing techniques and mass exit concepts that 
culminate with the conduct of five jumps from a C-17 or C-130 aircraft from 1,250 feet 
(Maneuver Center of Excellence, 2016a). According to the MCoEs BAC site, these 
jumps consist of a combination of combat equipment jumps, administrative jumps and at 
least one night time jump. During a combat equipment jump, the jumpers wear helmet, 
main and reserve parachutes, Moller ruck sack, a Modular Airborne Weapons Case 
(MAWC), and carry a dummy weapon (Maneuver Center of Excellence, 2016a). 
Conversely, a jumper only wears only helmet and the main and reserve parachutes during 
an administrative jump. Upon completion of the BAC, paratroopers earn an additional 
skill identifier shown in Table 2.  
Table 2.   Paratrooper Training. Source: Maneuver Center of Excellence 




Training does not stop for paratroopers once they leave the Basic Airborne 
Course. During the planning and preparation phases of an airborne training exercise or 
operation, leaders conduct a scrub of paratrooper training records. If a paratrooper has not 
performed a jump within six months, they are required to undergo a minimum of 6 hours 
of refresher training (United States Army Infantry School, 2014). The Training Circular 
for Static Line Parachuting Techniques and Training (2014), also states that if the 





















consists of the same 6 hours of instruction as the refresher training (p. F-1). Additionally, 
airborne units conduct rehearsals immediately before jumps, providing briefings to 
paratroopers on the mission, safety and proper procedures for jumping and landing. As a 
part of the rehearsals, paratroopers demonstrate their understanding of the brief through 
the conduct of mock door jumps and Parachute Landing Fall (PLF).  
A separate school exists for paratroopers utilizing the steerable RA-1 parachute, 
called the Military Free Fall (MFF) School. Special operations forces (SOF) personnel 
must complete four weeks of military free fall training at this school in Fort Bragg, NC 
and YPG, AZ. This specialized training consists of learning about altitude physiology and 
military free fall techniques, utilizing “mass exits, grouping exercises, night airborne 
operations and high-altitude airborne procedures in combat equipment and oxygen gear” 
(Pike, 2011b). Upon completion of the MFF School, paratroopers earn an additional skill 
identifier shown in Table 2. 
D. EVOLUTION OF PARACHUTES (T-3 THROUGH T-10 PARACHUTE) 
The current parachutes in the U.S. inventory have come a long way since the 
inception of airborne operations. This section provides a discussion of the evolution of 
parachutes used in military operations leading up to the T-11 ATPS.  
Following Mitchell’s introduction of the concept of “vertical envelopment,” the 
U.S. military began parachute research in 1919 at McCook Airfield with civilian 
enthusiast and history maker, Leslie Irvin. The initial focus of the research was to design 
and develop a life-saving parachute for Army Air Corps aviators; the result was the T-3 
parachute. The Airborne Test Platoon initially used the T-3 parachute, subsequently 
modifying it with a static line (Johnson, 1990). With the static line modification, the T-4 
parachute was born. The T-4’s design included a three-point harness with an attached 
back-pack tray containing the parachute and its suspension lines (Batchelor & Weeks, 
1982). It also contained a reserve parachute that was loosely connected to the front of the 
paratrooper to the harness by snap hooks. Primarily used by the Airborne Test Platoon 
and the 501st PIB in 1940, the T-4 was also utilized in Panama by the 551st PIB in 1943 
(Weeks, 1976). Figure 2 shows the T-4 parachute on test platoon soldiers. 
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Figure 2.  Test Platoon with T-4 Parachute. Source: Rigger Depot (n.d.). 
As WWII began, the need for modifications to the T-4 became apparent. The first 
change to the T-4 was the addition of extra webbing and stitching to secure the reserve D 
rings. Next, a single point quick release box was added. In existence from 1941, the T-5 
was the product of the two T-4 modifications mentioned earlier and remained in use until 
1945 (Rigger Depot,  n.d.). The T-7 parachute began replacing the T-5 in 1944. Designed 
from the start to be a static line parachute, the T-7 was more comfortable than its 
predecessor, with an improved reliability. It utilized the same three-point harness as the 
T-4 and T-5 parachutes, continuing to be a canopy opening first parachute. The T-7, 
however, had a slower rate of descent (ROD), and its thicker webbing design allowed the 
paratrooper to carry additional equipment that the T-4 and T-5 did not. The one thing that 
did not change from the T-3 through T-7 was the shape and size of the main and reserve 
canopies. Mrozek noted in his book, 82nd Airborne Division that the T-4 through T-7 
parachutes had 28-foot flat circular canopies and 22 to 24-foot diameter reserve 
parachutes (1997). 
The development and design of aircraft throughout WWII by the Air Force 
created problems for the canopy first opening T-7. Throughout WWII, the Air Force 
utilized commercial DC-3 airplanes that were hastily modified for the transport of 
airborne troops, transitioning later to the C-82 followed by the C-119. The C-82 had dual 
jump doors and a clamshell door in the back for equipment loading, but the C-119 was 
stronger, more powerful and faster. The Army paratroopers began having problems with 
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the T-7 when jumping from the faster C-119 due its higher speed. With a canopy first 
opening design, the paratroopers utilizing the T-7 experienced violent opening shocks, 
burnt out canopy panels, increased ROD, increased impact force with the ground, and a 
higher risk of injury (Johnson, 1990). The issues pointed to an incredible number of 
capability gaps, leading to the development of the T-10 parachute. While no requirements 
documents for the T-3 through T-10 were found during research, one can infer from the 
T-10’s design, that at least four key requirements for the T-7 replacement were necessary. 
The first assumed requirement is that the replacement parachute must be interoperable 
with the faster airplanes; second, it must have a slower ROD; third, the new parachute 
needs to continue to utilize static line operations; and fourth, it must support the increased 
weight of the paratrooper and his mission-essential equipment.  
Adopted as the standard in 1952 and completely replacing the T-7 by 1954, the 
canopy-last opening parachute, known as the T-10 is pictured in Figure 3 (Knapik et al., 
2014). The T-10’s canopy-last opening design addressed the interoperability need by 
using an opening sequence developed by the British that packed the parachute into not 
one, but two bags or packs. First, the canopy and lines left the pack as the jumper exited 
the aircraft. The canopy would then open once the suspension lines were completely 
deployed, causing the second bag to break open and release the canopy. This opening 
design allowed the paratrooper to fall below the slip stream of the aircraft before the 
canopy opened, significantly reducing the opening shock. The T-10 possessed a larger 
35-foot diameter inflated parabolic parachute compared to the 28-foot diameter of the T-
7. Its size and shape reduced both the number of entanglements and the ROD to 22 feet 
per second (Johnson, 1990). With a parachute system weight of 44 pounds (lbs.), the T-
10 parachute’s design supported an average jumper weight including their equipment, 
also known as the Total Jumper Weight (TJW), of 350 lbs. (Knapik, Graham, Steelman, 
Colliver, & Jones, 2011). Improving upon the T-7, the T-10’s harness had a single release 
instead of three release snaps, and incorporated canopy release systems on the shoulders 
that allowed the paratrooper to avoid being dragged on the ground during a windy day 
(Weeks & Batchelor, 1982). The T-10 experienced several small modifications over its 
lifespan that included; the addition of an anti-inversion canopy skirt netting, changes to 
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the canopy skirt pocket length and depth, a color change to foliage green, and a new 
detachable deployment bag (Mills Manufacturing, 2013a). Each of these modifications 
was denoted by a letter at the end of the T-10, such as B, C and D. 
 
Figure 3.  T-10 Parachute. Source: Weaver (2014). 
While the previous parachutes described were non-steerable, one would be remiss 
if the background did not briefly describe the evolution of steerable parachutes. Utilized 
toward the end of WWII by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the Special Forces, or 
Green Berets, required special equipment to perform the operations and special warfare 
tasked to them (Johnson, 1990). Born from Frank Derry’s patented design, cutting holes 
in the outer edges of canopies, the first steerable parachute materialized in 1944 (Gale 
Research, 1996). The first steerable parachute documented in military airborne operations 
was the MC1. The MC1’s design consisted of a modified T-10 canopy that included 
several cut-outs creating a gliding effect during the descent. The paratrooper could 
control the turns through two control lines manipulating the canopy. Documents found, 
suggest the development date of the MC1 to be post 1952 (T-10 development), and pre-
1976 (first Special Forces HALO jump in Vietnam). Modifications to the MC1 began in 
1976, mimicking those of the T-10. The most notable changes occurred in the 1988 
redesign by the U.S. Army, creating a canopy that opened quickly and had a ROD of four 
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to five meters per second (Mills Manufacturing, 2013). These modifications provided the 
paratrooper with increased control over the forward speed. Annotated as the MC1-1C, 
this redesigned parachute supported a TJW of 360 lbs., had a 360-degree turning time of 
eight to nine seconds, and a forward thrust of 9.5 miles per hour (Mills Manufacturing, 
2013b). The design pictured in Figure 4, however, resulted in paratroopers experiencing 
violent opening shocks, significant damage to the canopy and an increase in injuries 
during high-altitude static line jumps (Pike, 2011a). These issues, along with the growing 
TJW, were significant enough for the United States Army Special Operations Command 
(USASOC) to develop an Operational Requirements Document (ORD) for a replacement 
to the MC1-1C, called the Special Operations Forces Tactical Advanced Parachute 
(SOFTAPS). The SOFTAPS ORD included the following requirements: operator steering 
ability during descent through a turn and glide capability; reduced opening shock, lower 
ROD and interoperability with Special Operations aircraft (Pike, 2011c). 
 
Figure 4.  MC 1–1C Maneuverable Canopy Parachute. 
Source: Kidd (2012). 
While USASOC required a replacement for the MC1-1C, the conventional 
airborne forces also required a replacement for the T-10D (Lucas, 2005). Besides the turn 
and glide capability, the lower ROD, increased weight capacity and interoperability with 
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multiple aircraft platforms requirements were a match. The requirements for the 
SOFTAPS and the T-10’s replacement merged in 2005 into a single ORD titled the 
Advanced Tactical Parachute System (ATPS) ORD. This ORD combined the acquisition 
efforts and shared common components such as the reserve parachute, troop harness, the 
parachute pack tray and the static line. The ATPS ORD described the steerable variant 
parachute as a pre-planned product improvement (P3I) or Block II of the ATPS program. 
However, it was determined that the U.S. Army Special Forces Command’s (USASFC) 
interim solution, known as the SF-10A, met the requirements contained in the ATPS 
ORD. The SF-10A was subsequently integrated and tested with the ATPS reserve and 
troop harness, then type classified as the MC-6 parachute system (shown in Figure 5). 
The MC-6 parachute system consists of a modified polyconic, 28-foot diameter canopy, 
the T-11R reserve parachute, and the T-11 troop harness. The main capabilities of the 
MC-6 include a 360-degree turning time of five seconds, improved operational capability 
at high elevation drop zones with increased reliability and an increased maximum weight 
capacity of 400 lbs. (Airborne Systems, 2016). While the SF-10A was in use by USASFC 
since 1999, the MC-6 was fielded in 2006, three years prior to its counterpart, the T-11 
ATPS. 
 
Figure 5.  MC-6 Maneuverable Canopy Parachute. 
Source: Airborne Systems (2016). 
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Mass tactical jumps, described by Pike (2011a), are battalion or larger sized 
elements of paratroopers that are dropped from a few to several United States Air Force 
(USAF) aircraft onto a drop zone or objective. Units conducting mass tactical jumps can 
utilize either the T-11 non-steerable parachute, the MC-6 maneuverable parachute, or a 
combination of the parachutes depending on the commander’s evaluation of the mission, 
training and capabilities possessed by the paratroopers under their command and their 
personal level of acceptable risk. These areas, per the Army FM 3–99 for Airborne and 
Air Assault Operations (2015), is called condition setting (p.1-20). Putting the ability to 
maneuver a parachute during mass tactical jumps into the hands of inexperienced 
paratroopers significantly increases the risk of injury to paratroopers. This commander’s 
assessment, coupled with the idea posed by Batchelor & Weeks, that the airborne 
commander does not want the average military parachutist to do more than what is 
necessary to operate their parachute (1982) is why the majority of mass tactical parachute 
operations conducted by conventional forces prefer to utilize non-steerable parachutes 
such as the T-11 ATPS. 
Steerable parachutes have very different designs than that of their counterparts. 
With that being said, it is possible for them to experience a few similar issues. Looking at 
the evolution of both types of parachutes can enable combat developers and users to 
apply lessons learned to the requirements process and tactics, techniques, and procedures 
(TTP)) of future steerable and non-steerable parachutes. 
E. T-11 ADVANCED TACTICAL PARACHUTE 
Over the past 60 years the average weight of the paratrooper and the weight of 
their equipment has increased as shown in Figure 6. This increase in weight increases the 
risk of injury during a parachute landing. The increase in risk of injury greatly impacts 
the survivability of a paratrooper and impacts the airborne commanders’ ability to “mass” 
their forces on an objective. As a result, a requirement for a new parachute capable of 
supporting the increased Total Jumper Weight (TJW) was developed.  
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Figure 6.  Increasing Weight Capacity. Adapted from Maneuver Center of 
Excellence (2009). 
1. Program Summary 
The ATPS program is an Acquisition Category (ACAT) III program originating 
in 1995 from an Operational Requirements Document (ORD) produced by the U.S. Army 
Infantry Center (USAIC) and approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council 
(JROC), identifying the need for a parachute system capable of supporting an increased 
TJW of more than 360 lbs. with a lower risk of injury, to replace the T-10 Troop 
Parachute System (Lucas, 2005). Managed by PdM SCIE, the ATPS was developed in 
two blocks or increments with an approved Life-Cycle Cost Estimate (LCCE) of $401.59 
million to support the research, development, testing, and fielding activities of the system 
(Sloan, 2009). The ATPS program includes the T-11 non-steerable (Block I), and the 
MC-6 maneuverable (Block II) canopies, a shared reserve parachute (T-11R) and troop 
harness (U.S. Army Evaluation Center, 2009).  
The T-11 canopy is a static line deployed parachute, designed for mass tactical 
airborne operations from a minimum drop altitude of 500 feet AGL, from Army and Air 
Force aircraft travelling at speeds of 150 knots (International Defence Review, 2010). 
The T-11’s modified cross/cruciform shaped canopy, according to the International 
Defence Review (2010), has an average ROD of 19 feet per second compared to its 
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predecessors 22 feet per second, while also supporting an increased TJW of up to 400 
pounds.  
The T-11R reserve parachute, shown in Figure 7, is an aero-conical shaped 
parachute, designed to open rapidly with minimal collapse and altitude loss post inflation. 
Mounted on the front of the T-11 troop harness, the T-11R canopy is deployed by the 
paratrooper using either hand, to pull the activation handle located in the center of the 
pack. U.S. Army Evaluation Center (2009), noted that the reserve parachute uses a kicker 
spring to deploy the canopy, preventing the entanglement of the reserve with the main 
canopy. 
 
Figure 7.  T-11R Reserve Parachute. Source: U.S. 
Army Infantry School (2007). 
The T-11 harness was designed to meet the 5th percentile female through the 95th 
percentile male Soldier (Kalainov, 2000). The harness features shoulder riser attachment 
points for the T-11 main canopy as well as chest-mounted riser attachment points for the 
T-11R. Release points are a key characteristic of the troop harness enabling the 
paratrooper to quickly detach the main canopy. Additionally, the harness features 
equipment attachment points for items such as weapons cases and an equipment lowering 
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line, while allowing the quick removal of the harness in case of water landings (U.S. 
Army Evaluation Center, 2009). 
The ATPS program became a Program of Record in 1997, entering the 
Engineering, Manufacturing and Development (EMD) phase of the acquisition life-cycle, 
after receiving approval from a Milestone (MS) I, also known as MS B, decision review 
(Lucas, 2006). The program underwent several requirements updates, according to Lucas 
presentation on the ATPS history (2006), an initial design validation test failure, a 
program re-baseline in 2000 and extensive developmental and operational testing from 
2001 to 2006. The ATPS provides advanced parachute systems to both conventional and 
special operations forces that can support a higher TJW, with a decreased ROD, reducing 
the risk of injury to paratroopers.  
Achieving Type Classification (TC) in 2006, the MC-6 ATPS, including the T-
11R reserve and T-11 troop harness was fielded to conventional and SOCOM units 
beginning in April 2006 (Lucas, 2006). Since April 2006, a briefing by Lucas (2006), 
shows that PdM SCIE has fielded 24,944 MC-6 parachute systems, achieving Full 
Operational Capability (FOC) in 2013. In 2008, the T-11 ATPS achieved TC and began 
fielding to the 75th Ranger Regiment in 2009 and achieved FOC in 2014, fielding 43,708 
parachute systems to conventional airborne forces (Army Personnel Parachute Update, 
2014). 
2. Requirements 
The requirements documents of an acquisition program are a PdM’s guide in 
designing, developing, testing, and fielding a materiel solution or product. Governed by 
the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development (JCIDS) process, the development 
and updating of requirements documents is an iterative process, requiring close 
coordination between the Combat Developer, the warfighter/user, and the PdM 
(Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [CJCS], 2015). Stemming from the results of a 
study on injuries experienced by Rangers during Operation Just Cause, the Airborne 
Working Group (AWG) identified a need for a parachute that can support an increased 
weight capacity exceeding the T-10s current maximum weight capacity of 360 lbs. The 
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1995 study showed that 4% of the Rangers in 2/75th Ranger Battalion experienced jump 
related injuries when jumping combat loads that exceeded the maximum weight (Miser, 
Doukas, & Lillegard, 1995). In response to the need, the Combat Developer USAICS, 
conducted a Mission Needs Analysis (MNA), also known as a Capabilities Based 
Assessment (CBA). During the MNA, a Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, 
Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLFP-P) analysis was 
conducted concluding that 
there are no non-Materiel alternatives that will adequately provide or 
enable the capability to provide Legacy, Special Operations, Interim and 
Objective Forces with decreased rates of descent or landing impact 
velocity and impact force given the current weight and weight growth of 
the Soldier and his equipment. (p. 156)  
Additionally, a Cost Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA) was performed 
in 1996 utilizing the Belgian Study to suggest that a reduced ROD would significantly 
decrease the paratrooper injury rate compared to that of the T-10, thus maintaining 
combat power, minimizing the logistical burden, and paying for itself due to a 73% 
reduction in disability and lost work related injuries (United States Training and Doctrine 
Command, 2005). Subsequently, the ATPS ORD was developed and received approval 
by the JROC in 1996. This document merged two previous requirements documents, the 
Advanced Reserve and Harness System (ARHS) and Personnel Airdrop System (PAS) 
ORDs into one. After several updates to requirements, nine Key Performance Parameters 
(KPP), shown in Table 3, and 29 Additional Performance Attributes (APA) were 









Table 3.   Key Performance Parameters for Block I. Source: United States 
Training & Doctrine Command (2005). 
Key Performance 
Parameters 
Production Threshold (T) Production Objective (O) 
Net Ready This capability does not interface with the GIG 
core enterprise services so as a result there is no 
NR-KPP nor is supporting architecture products 
provided. 
 
System Certified on 
Jump Aircraft 
The ATPS must be certifiable on the C-130 and 
C-17.  
Certifiable on all Army, Air Force, 
Navy, and Marine aircraft currently 
certified for static line operations. 
Rate of Descent  
(Main Canopy) 
The rate of descent for the main canopy must not 
exceed 18 fps with a parachutist weighing 332 
pounds including equipment, exclusive of the 
ATPS.  
The rate of descent for the main 
canopy must not exceed 16 fps with a 
parachutist weighing 332 pounds 





The ATPS main canopy will be capable of 
operations at a minimum altitude of 375 feet 
above ground level (AGL) (500 feet AGL +/- 125 
feet altitude holding error) at 130 - 150 knots 
indicated airspeed (KIAS) with a parachutist 
weighing 332 pounds including equipment, 





Reliability for the ATPS must be equal to or better 
than the T-10 parachute system and the 
maintainability must not exceed 4.8 hours 
between mean time to repair. 
 
Rate of Descent  
(Reserve Parachute) 
The reserve parachute must consistently stabilize 
within 250 feet of altitude loss after activation 
(high speed/total malfunction of main canopy) and 
achieve a 27-fps average rate of descent during 
standard day conditions with a parachutist 
weighing 332 lbs. including equipment, exclusive 
of the ATPS. 
The reserve parachute must 
consistently stabilize within 250 feet of 
altitude loss after activation (high 
speed/total malfunction of main 
canopy) and achieve a 25 fps average 
rate of descent during standard day 
conditions with a parachutist weighing 
332 lbs. including equipment, 




A single activation procedure for both total/high 
speed or partial/low speed main canopy 
malfunctions. The procedure must take no longer 
to execute than the current “pull-drop” method 
and require a pull force of no less than 15 pounds 
and no more than 22 pounds. 
 
Force Transfer  
(Harness) 
The harness must be designed so that the opening 
forces of the advanced reserve parachute and the 
main canopy are transferred along the long axis of 
the jumper’s body and place the jumper in the 
proper orientation to execute a proper parachute 
landing fall under a fully deployed main canopy 




The advanced reserve parachute must demonstrate 
a reliability of at least 0.95 under partial 
malfunctions (low speed or no performance loss 
malfunctions) and at least 0.99 under a total 
malfunction (total or high speed malfunction). 
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As mentioned earlier, the ATPS program contains a requirement for a 
maneuverable parachute. Annotated as Block or Increment II in the ATPS OPD, the 
ATPS program planned to develop the maneuverable canopy utilizing pre-planned 
product improvement (P3I). Because of the match in requirements listed in SOCOM’s 
SOFTAPS ORD and the ATPS ORD Block II the two ORDs were merged into one. The 
five KPPs associated with the steerable canopy are listed in Table 4. Out of the five KPPs 
listed, the Automatic Activation Device remains as a P3I until technology becomes 
available. 
Table 4.   Key Performance Parameters for Block II. Source: United States 
Training & Doctrine Command (2005). 
Attribute Production Threshold Production Objective 
Turning Capability The MC will be capable of executing a 360-degree 
turn in a maximum of 7.7 seconds. 
The MC will be capable of executing a 
360-degree turn in a maximum of 5 
seconds. 
Glide Capability The MC will have a glide ratio of 1:1.  The MC will have a glide ratio of 1:2.
Rate of Descent The MC will have a landing rate of descent not to 
exceed 19 fps under standard day conditions at 
8,000 feet mean sea level. 
The MC will have a landing rate of 
descent not to exceed 16 fps under 
standard day conditions at 10,000 feet 
mean sea level. 
Automatic 
Activation 
The advanced reserve parachute shall incorporate 
an Automatic Activation Device (AAD) that will 
detect failure of the main parachute to deploy and 
inflate and will automatically activate the reserve 
parachute in the event of a high-speed malfunction. 
 
Landing The MC will provide a safe landing on land or in 
water under standard day conditions in a 13-knot 
wind maximum steady wind when facing 0 deg 
oblique to the direction of wind from 0–8,000 ft 
MSL.  
The MC will provide a safe landing on 
land or in water under standard day 
conditions in an 18-knot maximum 
steady wind when facing 45 deg 
oblique to the direction of wind from 
10,000 ft MSL. 
 
It is important to note the difference between KPPs and APAs. The Manual for 
the Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), 
defines KPPs as, “performance attributes of a system considered critical or essential to 
the development of an effective military capability” (2015). The failure of a product to 
meet the KPP threshold requirements can result in the need to update and revalidate a 
KPP threshold value or worse, cancellation of a program. An APA is a performance 
attribute of a system not considered critical to the mission, or the overall operation of the 
system, but still important enough to be included in the requirements document (Manual 
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for the Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), 
(2015). APAs are often called “nice to haves.” 
3. Testing 
Following the validation of the requirements documents, PdM SCIE developed a 
Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) to guide the developmental and operational 
testing of the ATPS. From 1997 to 1999, development and testing of a previously 
selected T-11 ATPS that utilized “leap-ahead technology” was conducted. After failing to 
meet critical performance requirements, the contract was terminated, and sources sought 
was released to industry (Lucas, 2006). Beginning in May 2000, PdM SCIE conducted 
the first of two “fly-off” tests between seven vendor designs. Down-selecting to two 
vendors, PdM SCIE conducted a second “fly-off” test in 2001. This resulted in a single 
contractor being selected, Para-Flite, and development continued into Technical 
Feasibility Testing (TFT) and four phases of Developmental Testing (DT), spanning three 
years.  
The DT phase I (DTI), described in the Interim Test Report for Developmental 
Test of the Advanced Tactical Parachute System (Tiaden, 2005), consisted of dropping 
over 600 mannequins from C-130 and C-17 aircraft, between 1,200 feet AGL to 7,500 
mean sea level (MSL), from airspeeds ranging from 130 to 150 knots. The weight of the 
mannequins used ranged between 108 to 332 lbs., representing the 5th percentile female 
to the 95th percentile male soldiers (Tiaden, 2005). Full and partial malfunctions of the 
main canopy were conducted during this phase, requiring the reserve parachute to deploy. 
Tiaden notes that the reserve was also deployed during this phase when no main canopy 
malfunction occurred, to test the possibility of main and reserve entanglement (2005). 
Additionally, DTI conducted testing to “quantify trajectory, opening shock, oscillation 
angle, rates of descent, altitude loss to full inflation, and reliability” (Tiaden, 2005). The 
canopy and reserve under both partial and complete malfunctions met the reliability 
requirements in DTI proceeding to DT phase II (DTII) in 2002.  
According to Tiaden’s report (2005), DTII consisted of 215 live jumps from C-
130 and C-17 aircraft. Four issues were discovered during this phase beginning with a 
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main canopy malfunction requiring the capture of four corner lines into the slider to 
prevent cross over with other suspension lines and abnormal canopy inflation. The 
opening of the canopy release unit cover flaps was also an issue requiring attention. The 
cover flaps on the canopy release unit are a redundant safety feature that safeguards 
against the inadvertent main canopy release. Third, the reserve belly band came loose on 
several occasions. It was also noted through user questionnaires, that the canopy control 
was extremely limited and unpredictable. These four issues were subsequently addressed 
and required DTI reliability retesting. 
DT phase Ib (DTIb) conducted 230 mannequin drops from C-130s in June 2003 
(Tiaden, 2005). The exit criteria to move on to DTIIb was an increased reliability of the 
main canopy and reserve canopy experiencing partial malfunction from .975 and .95 
to .99 with a 90% confidence level. Tiaden’s report (2005) noted that the main canopy 
and reserve met the increased reliability, subsequently proceeding to DTIIb in late 2003. 
DT phase IIb (DTIIb) revealed even more issues with the canopy. Conducting 212 
live jumps from both C-130 and C-17 aircraft in August 2003, Tiaden’s report (2005) 
concluded that the canopy was unable to meet the requirements for achieving the ROD, 
altitude loss, obstacle avoidance, and simultaneous door exit on C-17 requirements 
(Tiaden, 2005). The requirement ROD was 16 feet per second during steady-state (by 375 
feet after exit) during this test. DT results showed that paratroopers weighing under 222 
lbs. and jumping from the C-130 were the only group that met this requirement. The 
altitude loss requirement is described as a parachute deploying, inflating, and stabilizing 
by 275 feet from exit from the aircraft. The ATPS met this requirement on the C-130 for 
all weights but failed to meet the requirement on the C-17 when the paratrooper is greater 
than 300 lbs. During the dual door exit jump testing, where jumpers exited the aircraft 
with an approximate one second difference from opposite doors on a C-17 aircraft, it was 
identified that the left door jumper had a slower canopy opening than that of the right 
door jumper. Additionally, both jumpers involuntarily moved toward the centerline of the 
aircraft at four seconds after exit, leading to a collision between the two jumpers. Center-
lining can be described as the trajectory of the paratrooper after exiting, toward the center 
line of an aircraft due to the aerodynamics of large aircraft (Tiaden, 2006). Essentially the 
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airflow surrounding the C-17 pushes paratroopers who are conducting simultaneous exits 
from opposite doors toward each other.  
While the canopy failed to meet the ATPS ORD requirements, the reserve and 
harness performed well. PdM SCIE was advised to go back to the drawing board and find 
a new main canopy that could meet ROD threshold of 16 feet per second. After 
performing market research and establishing a competitive range, PdM SCIE conducted 
another “fly-off” test between five vendors. From this group of five, two were selected 
for a subsequent “Fly-off” that addressed glide, oscillation and center-lining (Lucas, 
2006). Figure 8 depicts how the PdM conducted its down-select from five to two vendors. 
The possibility that center-lining would still occur when jumping from a C-17 was 
identified during this fly-off. Stakeholders participating in the down-select were informed 
of this possibility during a briefing from PdM SCIE (Neises, 2004). The question of 
acceptability, if dual door performance could not be met, was posed to the warfighter. 
While the dual door performance requirement was a show stopper for conventional 
airborne forces like the XVIII Airborne Corps and 82nd Airborne Division, it was only 
listed as an APA. PdM SCIE waited for a decision from the user with two options; if the 
user accepted this possibility, they could continue testing; if they did not accept this the 
program could be cancelled and go back to technology research and development. The 
user accepted the possibility and allowed PdM SCIE to proceed with testing. 
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Figure 8.  PdM SCIE Scoring Criteria for Possible ATPS Main Canopy 
Solutions. Source: Neises (2004). 
Following the second “fly-off,” Para-Flite was selected as the vendor to provide the 
T-11 ATPS canopy. In 2005, the ATPS ORD was updated to reflect a more realistic and 
attainable ROD, changing it to 18 feet per second (Threshold) and 16 feet per second 
(Objective). Developmental testing on the Para-Flite canopy began in October 2005 (Lucas, 
2006). Testing was conducted on multiple fixed and rotary wing aircraft beginning at 1,200 
feet AGL with a minimum jumper weight with equipment of 200 lbs. Completing 190 
jumps during testing, data showed that the T-11 canopy was only slightly worse than the T-
10D regarding center-lining, and the test community regarded the hazard as the same as the 
T-10D (Tiaden, 2006). Furthermore, the testing showed that the canopy would not meet the 
18 feet per second ROD requirement either. The same report showed that for a 380-lb. 
jumper, the average ROD achieved during testing was 19.2 feet per second from a C-130 
and a 360-lb. jumper averaged a ROD of 19.1 feet per second from a C-17 (2006). Even 
though testing showed an inability of the canopy to meet the 18 feet per second ROD 
requirement, the information presented by Tiaden (2006), noted that it was a 2.8 feet per 
second decrease from that of the T-10D. The Developmental Test Command (DTC) also 
recommended a minimum altitude for a parachute drop of 550 feet on a C-130 and 525 feet 
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on a C-17 (Tiaden, 2006). Another issue identified during testing of the T-11 ATPS canopy 
was corner vent entanglements. During DT phase III (DTIII), while conducting a live dual 
door jump, the first corner vent canopy entanglement occurred. Concerned about the 
possibility of future entanglements and wanting to understand the probable frequency and 
level of injury associated with these types of entanglements, PdM SCIE requested that 
DTC conduct corner vent entanglement simulations. The results of the simulated corner 
vent entanglements conducted by DTC, showed that the inherent stability in the T-11 main 
canopy kept the jumpers adequately separated so that they could perform proper actions 
upon landing after entanglement with minimal risk of injury. Additionally, the simulated 
jumpers impacted the ground post entanglement at less than 27 feet per second (Allen, 
2011). DTIII was halted in 2006, when a human systems integration (HSI) error was 
identified. Paratroopers felt the operation of the canopy release assemblies (CRA) was 
difficult, especially during cold weather situation, resulting in the need to remove cold 
weather gloves to utilize the canopy releases (Tiaden, 2006). Subsequently, the CRAs were 
modified, tested and approved by the XVIII Airborne Corps CG.  
Beginning in 2007, the T-11 ATPS began Operational Testing (OT). Throughout 
OT, 3,646 jumps were conducted on C-130, C-17, CASA 212, UH-60, and CH-47 
platforms (U.S. Army Evaluation Center, 2009). Testing occurred at three locations: Fort 
Bragg, NC; Fort Carson, CO; and Fort Wainwright, AK. The OT was conducted in a 
realistic operational environment, with test paratroopers, jumpmasters, operational 
jumpers. Multi-ship and single ship air movements and jumps were conducted to test 
mass tactical parachute operations as well.  
During OT, many issues were discovered, but two involved KPPs contained in the 
ORD. The U.S. Army Evaluation Center (2009), identified the first issue as the minimum 
jump altitude. The ORD requirement states a minimum jump altitude of 375 feet AGL, 
while the minimum safe jump altitude identified from a C-130 is 550 feet AGL and 525 
feet AGL for the C-17 (U.S. Army Evaluation Center, 2009). Table 5 shows the results of 
DT on the altitude loss to 27 feet per second velocity.  
 
 30
Table 5.   DT Results of Altitude Loss to 27 fps Velocity. Source: U.S. Army 
Evaluation Center (2009). 
 
 
The second KPP that was not met by the T-11 ATPS, is the ROD threshold of 18 
feet per second. The U.S. Army Evaluation Center’s report recognized that, while the T-
11 ATPS does not meet the KPP (averages 19.1 feet per second), it is a significant 
decrease from the T-10D (2009). Table 6 shows the comparison between the ATPS and 
T-10 canopies ROD at steady state. 
Table 6.   T-11 ATPS and T-10 ROD at Steady State. Source: U.S. Army 
Evaluation Center (2009). 
 
 
Although not a KPP, the size and weight of the T-11 were addressed in OT. When 













All Weights 40 280 32.4 345 344.2
> 300 21 298.1 22.5 347.3 344.2
< 300 19 260 30.1 327.1 325.4
> 365 11 302.9 24.1 363.3 344.2
All Weights 38 230.6 29.2 289.7 297.2
> 215 31 235.1 27.7 292.4 297.2
> 300 12 242.5 30.7 317.5 292.7
> 215 & < 300 19 230.4 25.4 286.9 297.2
> 343 5 232.2 27.8 326.6 258.4


















360 19.1 22.4 21.9 28.9
300 17.3 21.9 20.3 25.4
250 15.5 20.4 18.8 24.2
200 14.5 17.7 17.3 21.7
ATPS T‐10
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caused them to sit more forward in the seat than they had previously, causing pain in the 
back of their legs from the pressure of the metal bar on the front of the seat (U.S. Army 
Evaluation Center, 2009). Compared to the T-10D, the system weight is 9-lbs. heavier at 
53-lbs. vs. 44-lbs. (includes reserve parachute). The next issue identified by OT was the 
pack time of the parachute. The U.S. Army Evaluation Center (2009), reported that the T-
11 ATPS had an average pack time of 21 minutes per parachute, four minutes over the 
ORD APA of 17 minutes per parachute. Evaluators also noted in this report, that as the 
riggers continued packing the T-11 ATPS, many individuals’ pack times decreased, 
indicating a learning curve effect. The number of collisions and entanglements was also 
recorded during OT. Ten incidents were recorded out of 3,646 jumps, a 0.0027 
probability of occurrence. Only three of the incidents resulted in injuries. Table 7 shows 
the number and type of incidents experienced during OT (U.S. Army Evaluation Center, 
2009). From the maneuverability aspect, testing also recognized that the T-11 ATPS does 
take longer to maneuver and travel, but paratroopers can avoid obstacles when they are 
observant and act quickly before the said obstacle. 
Table 7.   Operational Test Collision/Entanglements Incidents. Source: U.S. 


















OT of the T-11 ATPS found the system suitable and effective (U.S. Army 
Evaluation Center, 2009). While there were KPPs that were not met, the Combat 
Developer accepted the change to the minimum jump altitude and the increased ROD. 
Their acceptance is documented in a Department of the Army (DA) G-3/4/7 
Memorandum, dated December 16, 2009. Following OT, the program received TC, and 
subsequently gained a decision approval for Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) in July 
2009. PdM SCIE began fielding the T-11 ATPS in 2009 to the 75th Ranger Regiment, 
making them the First Unit Equipped (FUE). Since 2009, the T-11 ATPS program has 
fielded 43,708 parachute systems to conventional airborne forces, phasing out the T-10 
parachute in 2014 (Army Personnel Parachute Update, 2014). The program continues to 
work with the Combat Developer, the user, and other partners to sustain the T-11 ATPS. 
Since its fielding, the T-11 ATPS has experienced entanglements and T-11R inadvertent 
activations. The program is currently working with all the stakeholders to address issues 
they are having and possible solutions to the problems. 
F. SUMMARY 
The U.S. airborne forces are arguably considered the spearhead of the Army’s 
force projection. Capable of deploying anywhere in the world at a moment’s notice, the 
United States relies on airborne forces to conduct forcible entry operations to seize or 
hold an area, enabling follow-on operations against adaptable and unpredictable 
adversaries (FM 3–99 Airborne and Air Assault Operations, 2015). To facilitate these 
airborne missions a need arose to replace the aging and inadequate T-10 and MC1-1 
parachutes. Thus, the Army developed, tested, produced and fielded the T-11 ATPS and 
MC-6 parachute systems to conventional and special airborne operations forces 
beginning in 1997 (Lucas, 2006). Developmental and operational testing of the 
parachutes discovered several inadequacies with the T-11 ATPS when comparing it 
against the required performance parameters contained in the ORDs. Entanglements, rate 
of descent, minimum jump altitude, and rigger packing times were a few of these. While 
the MC-6 began fielding in 2006, it only fulfilled four out of the five Block II KPPs listed 
in Table 4. The Automatic Activation Device (AAD) remains a P3I for the reserve 
parachute for the ATPS (United States Training & Doctrine Command, 2005). The T-11 
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ATPS was fielded beginning in 2009, immediately following acceptance of its 
limitations, phasing out its predecessor in 2014. Compared to the T-10, the T-11 ATPS is 
a substantial improvement, even with the inadequacies listed earlier. As the life-cycle 
manager, it is important for PdM SCIE to continue to work with all the T-11 ATPS 
stakeholders to identify, address and hopefully fix issues early on. 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter reviews studies that analyzed injuries sustained while executing 
military airborne operations and identified factors that help define the development of 
requirements for tactical parachutes. These studies also reviewed the T-10 and T-11 
ATPS to provide a comparison of the current and legacy parachute systems. Additionally, 
the main concerns of the stakeholders within the airborne community, regarding the T-11 
ATPS, are identified, and the steps taken to address them are distinguished. This 
information will help guide the analysis in Chapter V to inform the recommendation.  
B. INJURY STUDIES 
The overarching requirement in military airborne operations is to have a 
parachute that enables personnel to exit from an aircraft and land safely, prepared to 
fight. A journal article on military parachuting injuries reviewed jumps ranging from 
1941 until 1998 and identified the causality of injuries that are still seen in airborne 
operations today. Increasing wind speed, simultaneous exits, night jumps, equipment 
carried, height, weight and experience of the paratrooper increase the risk and rate of 
injuries (Bricknell & Craig, 1999). These factors must be addressed when developing 
tactical parachute requirements for use in military airborne operations.  
Since the initial fielding of the T-11 ATPS, two different studies were conducted 
by the U.S. Army Public Health Institute (USAPHI) to provide information regarding 
injuries sustained by Army paratroopers while utilizing the T-11 ATPS. The first study, 
conducted by Knapik et al., covered a six-month period between March and September 
2010, with a purpose of providing “preliminary information on the new T-11 Advanced 
Tactical Parachute System at the U.S. Army Airborne School (USAAS)” (2011). 
Observing over 30,755 jumps during this study, the researchers documented only 76 
injuries. These 76 injuries were subsequently broken down in the report’s findings 
showing that the T-11 averaged 1.60 injuries per 1,000 jumps, while the T-10 averaged 
2.85 injuries per 1,000 jumps; the T-11 achieved 44% lower incidence of injury. Knapik 
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et al. (2011), attributed the lower incidence of injury of the T-11 ATPS to the increased 
size of the main canopy. A few downfalls of the larger canopy were noted, such as an 
increased likelihood of a paratrooper experiencing lateral drift, which increases the 
probability of a tree landing. Withstanding the increased likelihood of a paratrooper 
landing in a tree, the 2011 USAPHI study concluded that the injury incidence was lower 
with the T-11 parachute compared to the T-10 specifically during daytime training jumps 
without combat loads (Knapik et al., 2011).  
The second study, conducted again by the USAPHI, covered a 3.5-year period, 
from June 2010 through November 2013 (Knapik et al., 2014). The purpose of this 
second study was to compare the injury rates between the T-10 and the T-11 as during the 
fielding of the T-11 to the operational Army airborne units. Observing administrative/
non-tactical jumps (jumps without combat loads) and combat loaded jumps (jumps with a 
weapons case and rucksack) during daytime and nighttime conditions, this study had an 
increased scope. The researchers also observed multiple operational units that included 
the 82nd Airborne Division, the XVIII Airborne Corps, and the 18th Air Support 
Operations Group, increasing the number of jumps observed and analyzed. This same 
study recorded 1,101 injuries out of 131,747 jumps (Knapik et al., 2014). Out of the 
1,101 injuries the T-10 experienced an injury incidence of 9.1 cases per 1,000 jumps, 
while the rate of injury incidence experienced with the T-11 was 5.2 cases per 1,000. 
Researchers concluded that the T-11’s injury risk was lower compared to that of the T-10 
under almost all operational conditions, except for entanglements (1 in 2,816 jumps), 
making it the safest parachute to jump during training and combat jumps (Knapik et al., 
2014). 
Although deemed safer than the T-10 parachute, the T-11 ATPS still must 
mitigate concerns identified within the airborne community. The next section identifies 
these concerns from the stakeholders’ perspective, evaluates the actions taken to address 
them, and determines the current status of the program. 
 37
C. T-11 ATPS ISSUES/CONCERNS 
After observing two phases of DT, an Initial Operational Test & Evaluation 
(IOT&E) event and at least two different studies on the T-11 ATPS, data from over 
166,000 jumps was recorded and analyzed statistically, showing that the T-11 ATPS is 
much more reliable and significantly decreases the amount of injury incidences than its 
predecessor, the T-10. The statistics, however, do not make the deaths of nine 
paratroopers (Table 8) any easier to accept. Investigations into these deaths identified the 
causes, which ranged from a lack of training, poor exits, and pre-jump inspections for six 
of the deaths (Product Manager Soldier Clothing and Individual Equipment, 2015). Two 
other deaths were determined to have been caused by premature activation of a 
paratrooper’s reserve and debris left in another paratrooper’s parachute, preventing it 
from properly deploying. The latest death, that of a Mexican paratrooper during a training 
exercise at Fort Bragg, NC, in 2016 is still under investigation (Jahner, 2016). These fatal 
T-11 ATPS incidents are a great source of concern to the Airborne community, most 
notably to the XVIII Airborne Corps.  
Table 8.   Soldier Deaths. Adapted from Dolasinski (2016) and Product Manager 
Soldier, Clothing, and Individual Equipment (2015).  
 
 
LTG Anderson, the CG of the XVIII Airborne Corps, authored a memorandum in 
2015 to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA), outlining seven primary concerns 
Year Type of Parachute Used Location Type of Training Root Cause 
2010 T‐11 ATPS Fort Lee, VA Rigger Student  Training
Lack of DZ and surrounding 
area prep 
2011 T‐11 ATPS Fort Bragg, NC 82D ABN Training
Improper packing didn't allow 
parachute to fully inflate
2013 T‐11 ATPS Fort Stewart, GA 1/75th Ranger Regiment High winds
2013 T‐11 ATPS Fort Benning, GA Basic Airborne Student Training
Soldier failed to maneuver to 
avoid other paratrooper
2014 T‐11 ATPS Fort Bragg, NC 82nd ABN Training  Improper JPMI
2014 T‐11R with MC‐6 El Centro, CA Navy Seal 
Inadvertent reserve parachute 
activation
2015 T‐11 ATPS Fort Bragg, NC 1/505th 82nd ABN Training  Weak exit
2015 T‐11 ATPS Fort Polk, LA JRTC 37th EN, 82nd ABN Training
Poorly secured rucksack struck 
another soldiers parachute
2016 T‐11 ATPS Fort Bragg, NC Mexican Army paratrooper unknown/under investigation
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regarding the T-11 ATPS. The concerns identified in this memorandum are shown in 
Table 9. 
Table 9.   XVIII Airborne Corps Commander Memorandum. 
Source: Anderson (2015). 
 
 
Many of these issues were identified through XVIII Airborne Corps’ lessons 
learned prompting PdM SCIE, along with members of the airborne community such as 
the Quartermaster School (QMS), TRADOC Capabilities Manager (TCM) Soldier under 
the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE), Capabilities Development and Integration 
Directorate (CDID), and the U.S. Army Natick Soldier Research, Development and 
Engineering Center’s (NSRDEC) Aerial Delivery Directorate (ADD), to work toward 
finding solutions through either materiel or non-materiel solutions prior to the 2015 
memorandum. To formally guide the numerous agencies involved in addressing Army 
airborne concerns, the Secretary of the Army directed the formation of the Army 
Airborne Board (AAB), chaired by the CG of the XVIII Airborne Corps (ABC) in 
January 2016 (Mankel, 2016). To create unity within the airborne community, the AAB 
officially charged a joint working group (JWG), comprised of subject matter experts 
(SME), with the responsibility to evaluate and address parachute concerns relating to 
doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and policy 
(DOTMLPF-P). Table 10 describes the members of the subgroups within the JWG. Each 
member of the JWG is considered a stakeholder within the airborne community and for 












Table 10.   Army Airborne Board Joint Working Group DOTMLPF-P Subgroups. 
Adapted from Maneuver Center of Excellence (2016b). 
 
 
The AAB and JWG gained a consensus on the priorities of the identified concerns 
based on risks, non-materiel or materiel solutions, and the length of time to develop the 
solution. Figure 9 illustrates the established priorities of the AAB. A DOTMLPF-P 
analysis was conducted on each of the areas of concern to determine a path forward for 
the airborne community and the parachute. Table 11 traces the issues identified by the 
















Figure 9.  AAB Established Priorities. Source: Army Airborne Board (2016). 
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Table 11.   Issue Trace Matrix. Adapted from Anderson (2015), Army Airborne 
Board (2016), Tiaden (2005), United States Army Evaluation Center 
(2009), United States, Training and Doctrine Command (2005). 
 
 
1. T-11 Reserve Parachute Inadvertent Activation 
The T-11R or reserve pack tray became a critical issue requiring immediate 
attention after the death of a Navy SEAL using the MC-6 parachute in 2014 (Steele, 
2016). The MC-6 and T-11 parachutes share the same reserve, the T-11R, and troop 
harness, but utilize very different canopies. A Safety of Use Message (SOUM) was 
issued following the T-11R incident stating that the possible cause of the reserve was a 
“loose tuck flap on the jumpmaster’s T-11R ripcord assembly allowed cross-winds to 
catch under the assembly, which subsequently caused the accidental reserve deployment” 
(United States Government AMHS 4.0., 2014). A DOTMLPF-P analysis concluded that, 
although the inadvertent activation of a T-11R is unlikely, the ramifications of an 
activation could have devastating consequences for a paratrooper. The JWG identified 
changes to jumpmaster procedures and rigger procedures, and the fielding of a materiel 
T-11 Issues CPD                  Requirement
Developmental Testing  
(Issue Identified)
Operational Testing   
(Issue Identified) 
Identified in 
XVIII ABC CG 
Memorandum
Indentified 
Priority of  
AAB JWG 
Was it a root 
cause of a 
Paratrooper 
Death?
1. T-11R Inadvertent 
Activation
KPP - Reserve Activiation 
Procedures - Minimum 
Force Required 15 lbs; 
Maximum force 22 lbs
Reserve modified and 
retested N N Y Y
2. Corner Cross-Over 
Inversion N
DTII modified main 
canopy to capture 4 
corner lines into the 
slider
N Y Y N
3. Corner Vent 
Entanglement APA - Maneuverability
DT simulated corner vent 
entanglements(2007)
5 occurences in 3,646 
jumps 0 injuries <.2%; 
Considered met
Y Y N
4. Main Curve Pin 
Sensitivity
N N Y Y Y N
5. Parachute Weight & 
Size
APA - System Weight 
APA < 60 pounds
N
System weighs 53lbs 
w/reserve; noted 
Paratrooper discomfort 




52 pax on C-130 
Y Y N
6. Increase Awareness of 
Partial and Complete 
Parachute Malfunctions
Equipment Training N N Y Y N
7. Reduce Parachute 
Deployment Sequence
N N N Y Y N
8. Reduce Complexity of 
Parachute Packing 
Procedures
APA - Packing Time (17 
minutes per parachutes) N
Packing Time APA (17 




insert would be an interim solution to inadvertent activations (Army Airborne Board, 
2016). The PdM-developed interim solution is depicted in Figure 10. PdM SCIE 
modified the top and bottom flaps of the T-11R parachutes utilizing the insert without 
increasing the amount of force required to pull the reserve ripcord. Wind tunnel testing 
on the interim solution observed no release of the reserve parachute with inserts installed 
and with winds up to 150 knots. Due to the uncertainty of the long-term effects on the 
usage of the inserts, PdM SCIE and NSRDEC continue to conduct Design Validation 
Testing (DVT) on two candidate solutions that modify both the ripcord handle and the T-
11R pack tray (Army Airborne Board, 2016). 
 
(L) Shows the inserts and the (R) shows inserts on the original T-11R pack tray. 
Figure 10.  T-11R Interim Solution Inserts. Source: Bryan (2014). 
Interestingly, the possible use of the RA-1 reserve has not been discussed in the 
AAB JWG. In addition to providing a possible solution T-11R inadvertent activation, it 
could also fulfill the ATPS Block II AAD KPP requirement. When asked about possible 
solutions to the T-11R issue, MCoE and PdM SCIE stated that the technology for the 
AAD, in low altitude jumps, is still being researched and is not available for 
implementation (J. Yancey, personal communication, December 12, 2016). 
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2. Reduce Corner Vent Crossover Inversion 
The corner crossover inversion is a rare but potentially catastrophic malfunction 
that occurs when the deployment sleeve of the parachute separates from the canopy and 
materiel in the corner and crosses over to another part of the canopy, creating a bubble-
like distortion, disrupting the canopy deployment sequence. The JWG determined that to 
gain more control over the corner vent panes, efforts are underway to test a retainer band 
and packing loop tie that will create tension on the suspension lines, as well as working 
on getting a Modification Work Order (MWO) from TCM Soldier (Army Airborne 
Board, 2016). 
3. Reduce Corner Vent Entanglements 
During simultaneous mass exit operations with the T-11 ATPS, studies have 
shown an increased risk in the number of entanglements, with the most common type 
being a corner vent entanglement as shown in Figure 11. The primary concern with 
entanglements is that the different weights of the jumpers could cause a heavier jumper to 
become tangled in a lighter jumper’s parachute or suspension lines below them, causing 
either or both canopies to lose shape or completely deflate. The corner vent entanglement 
scenario occurred for the first time during DT Phase III, resulting in the need for further 
testing via simulation by the developmental testing team at Yuma Proving Ground 
(YPG). The subsequent simulations conducted at YPG showed that while T-11 
entanglements can and will occur, the canopies of both jumpers remained inflated after 
becoming stable at 400 feet of altitude loss; minimal damage to the canopy skirt was 
experienced but easily repairable; the mannequins maintained 10 - 12 feet of separation 
during the fall and even when encountering the ground. The testers concluded that the 
risk of injury with the T-11 ATPS, even during entanglements, was lower than that of its 
predecessor (Allen, 2011). While the YPG testers intentionally induced these 
entanglements, two other studies published by the USAPHI in 2011 and 2014 observed 
that the risk of entanglement was only 0.33 per 1,000 jumps and 0.22 per 1,000 jumps 
respectively for the T-11 ATPS (Knapik et al., 2011; Knapik et al., 2014). Through an 
analysis, it was determined that training and rehearsals must stress the importance of 
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proper exits and the jumpmasters control of paratroopers during their exit to effectively 
address this issue (Bergmann, 2013a). The AAB, however, directed the PdM to analyze 
potential materiel solutions to prevent entanglements. Two proposed solutions reviewed 
were sewing or tacking the vents and adding mesh netting in the corners. Research of 
these solutions showed, that each one could increase the overall risk to the paratrooper. 
Corner vents are vital to the performance of the T-11; changing the vents could lead to 
increased collisions, as well as, increase the size and weight of the system (Army 
Airborne Board, 2016). PdM recommended closing out mesh netting as a potential 
solution, but the AAB still wants to review other potential materiel solutions before 
deciding (Army Airborne Board, 2016). 
  
Figure 11.  T-11 Corner Vent Entanglement. Source: Duncan (2016). 
4. Reduce Sensitivity of Main Curve Pin 
The QMS reported several instances of the main curve pin dislodging, 
subsequently causing premature opening of the parachute pack trays (Figure 12). The 
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biggest concern, however, was the possibility that a more catastrophic incident could 
happen where the misdirection of the curved pin could cause the static line of the 
parachute to become lodged and disrupt the deployment sequence of the main canopy 
(Army Airborne Board, 2016). The PdM and the JWG came up with a solution of 
installing a packing tie that consisted of securing the curved pin to the pack closing loop 
with a size 3 cotton thread, as seen in Figure 13. The proposed materiel solution was 
determined to have second and third order impacts to training, parachute packing, and 
JMPI procedures necessitating testing of the tie. The materiel solution is still under 
debate while improvements in training and awareness are the interim solution, such as the 
jumpmaster checking for the correct location and position of the curved pin when 
performing a Jumpmaster Personnel Inspection (JMPI) and the parachute rigger having a 
good rotation when storing the T-11 ATPS (Bergmann, 2013b). The AAB wants to 
review additional solutions and materials for a long-term solution. 
 
Figure 12.  Main Curve Pin (#8). 
Source: United States Army Jumpmaster School (2014). 
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Figure 13.  Main Curve Pin Safety Tie. Source: Army Airborne Board (2016). 
5. Reduce Parachute Size and Weight 
The pack tray of the T-11 ATPS that holds the main canopy and risers is 
approximately 20 inches long by 16 inches wide by 14 inches deep and weighs about 38 
lb. (U.S. Army Evaluation Center, 2009). The reserve parachute weighs another 14.8 lb., 
making the T-11 ATPS approximately 53 lb. altogether (United States, Headquarters & 
Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, 507th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 2014). The 
increased size and weight of the T-11 ATPS can negatively impact a paratrooper’s 
exiting procedures which are crucial to the proper deployment of the parachute. During 
operational testing, it was observed that the size of the pack tray caused paratroopers to 
sit forward in their seat while in the C-130 aircraft, causing discomfort due to pressure 
from the metal bar of the seat on their legs (U.S. Army Evaluation Center, 2009). The 
increased size of the T-11 ATPS along with the additional equipment that airborne units 
deploy with can dramatically reduce the number of paratroopers that the unit can mass 
upon their objective. The maximum number of paratroopers transported on a C-130 
without pallets is 64. Since the fielding of the T-11 ATPS, the XVIII Airborne Corps 
units have modified their loading plans on C-130s to have approximately 45 paratroopers 
due to the size of the T-11 pack trays, as well as the increasing size of other personnel 
equipment. The DOTMLPF-P analysis concluded that any reduction in weight would 
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result in a critical design change (Army Airborne Board, 2016). The AAB does not have 
a current planned solution for this concern. 
6. Increase Awareness of Parachute Complete or Partial Malfunction 
An analysis of complete or partial malfunction of the T-11 determined that these 
concerns should be addressed through training and leadership to ensure every paratrooper 
is aware of the different types of malfunctions during the “first and second points of 
performance in Sustained Airborne Training” (Anderson, 2015). The idea behind this is 
that, if the first and second points of performance are correctly performed, there will not 
be a malfunction but if there is a malfunction, the earlier the paratroopers recognize the 
malfunction, the earlier they can activate their reserve. The two types of malfunctions are 
known as total and partial malfunctions. A total malfunction is when the parachute fails 
to inflate, requiring the paratrooper to activate their reserve immediately. A partial 
malfunction includes any of the following: a semi-inversion, squid, cigarette roll or 
complete inversion with damage to the canopy or suspension lines, or a sleeve corner 
vent entanglement (United States Army Jumpmaster School, 2014). Apart from a full or 
complete inversion, these also require the paratrooper to activate his or her reserve 
immediately. The U.S. Army Jumpmaster School, Student study guide (2014), notes that 
a strong first point of performance, “proper exit, check body position, and count,” can 
prevent many parachute malfunctions. During this point of performance, the paratroopers 
must jump out away from the aircraft into a bent forward position with their elbows tight 
to their sides, knees and feet together, and their hands upon their reserve with their 
fingers spread apart. Once the aircraft is exited, they are to count by thousands beginning 
from one thousand to six one thousand. At the end of the count the Student Guide (2014), 
instructs they enter the second point of performance where they “check canopy and gain 
canopy control.” During this point of performance, they should be on the lookout for any 
malfunction that may have occurred, that is, looking for any twists, tears, or other items 
in their canopy that can cause them to fall faster than other jumpers around them. If they 
determine that they are falling faster they are instructed to pull their reserve (United 
States Army Jumpmaster School, 2014). Strong initial training, refresher training and 
rehearsals are proposed to address this issue.  
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7. Reduce Parachute Deployment Sequence 
The T-11 system takes six seconds to fully inflate compared to the four seconds of 
the T-10. Leadership within the XVIII Airborne Corps are concerned that inexperienced 
paratroopers will “pull their reserve prematurely” because of feeling as though their main 
canopy was not deploying properly. Testing has shown that the T-11 ATPS has the same 
lift as the T-10 at four seconds. An analysis determined that this concern should be 
addressed through training and leadership; focusing on jumper awareness (Maneuver 
Center of Excellence, 2016b). Per the Assistant Product Manager (APdM) for SCIE, this 
issue has not been “as hot of an item because it seems the 1/507th PIR has updated their 
training and we are seeing an increase in jumper awareness” (B. Duncan, personal 
communication, October 31, 2016).  
8. Reduce Complexity of Parachute Packing Procedures 
As noted in the 2009 Operational Evaluation Report, the complexity of the new T-
11 ATPS required more steps and more time for riggers to effectively and safely pack the 
parachute. The report also showed that as the riggers packed more parachutes the average 
pack time decreased to the pack time requirement identified in the ORD and CPD (U.S. 
Army Evaluation Center, 2009). The issue concerning the complexity of the packing 
procedure is that if it is too complex, then there is a higher risk of incidence from 
improper packing, as well as requiring an increased force structure in the Rigger MOS to 
keep up with the parachute packing demand of the airborne units. 1/507th Parachute 
Infantry Regiment submitted three different packing variations to PdM SCIE. 
Subsequently PdM SCIE took the different packing variations to YPG and conducted 
additional mannequin testing to determine the performance of each variation (Schauer, 
2016). The most promising variation was the Accordion Fold (AF), but it did not meet 
the ROD threshold requirements. It was recommended that the PdM pursue this packing 




Studies show that the factors that lead to injuries in airborne operations have not 
changed over the years. The increasing weight of soldiers and the equipment they carry 
necessitated the requirement to develop a parachute that could lower injury rates and 
maintain combat power. The development of the T-11 ATPS has decreased the rate of 
injuries, but the system still has issues that require attention in the form of materiel 
updates or modifications, a redesign of the canopy or changes to doctrine, training and 
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IV. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides an explanation on how data was collected for this case and 
describe the analysis methods utilized in Chapter V that answer the research questions 
presented in Chapter I. 
B. DATA OVERVIEW 
The data obtained in this project covers information about the history of airborne 
operations, provides an explanation of the different variations of parachutes, and 
describes the current T-11 ATPS and the issues associated with it. The research includes 
data gathered through telephonic interviews with: PdM SCIE, Training and Doctrine 
Capabilities Manager (TCM) Soldier Systems Branch (SSB), Program Executive Office 
Soldier (PEO Soldier), and Natick Soldier Research, Development, and Engineering 
Center (NSRDEC) Aerial Delivery Directorate (ADD). The research also includes data 
extracted from previously published and un-published articles, studies, and other 
pertinent documentation.  
C. ANALYSIS STRATEGY 
Chapter V uses the T-11 issues identified in Chapter III to conduct an analysis of 
four possible acquisition approaches to inform the recommendation. The acquisition 
approaches considered in this project are  
 incremental upgrade: adjustments or modifications are made to 
any component of the currently fielded T-11 ATPS and the 
production process is updated with the change for future 
procurements;  
 new design development: requires the complete new design of the 
system or a component of the system to address issue; 
 non-materiel solution: requires an update to one or more of the 
following areas: doctrine, organization, training, leadership, 
personnel, or policy to address an issue; 
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 combination approach: solution requires the uses more than one of 
the acquisition approaches to address the issue. 
The analysis identifies the advantages and disadvantages of each approach from a 
stakeholder’s perspective and the DOD Decision Support System lens of cost, schedule, 




A. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter provides an analysis of four acquisition approaches as options to 
address eleven issues or concerns identified throughout the development, testing, and 
fielding of the T-11 ATPS. Rate of descent (ROD), minimum jump altitude, and the 
ability to conduct simultaneous door exits are concerns that were added to the analysis in 
addition to the eight issues identified by the AAB JWG. Table 12 provides a list of T-11 
ATPS issues and concerns that are included as part of the analysis. The advantages and 
disadvantages of each approach will be reviewed from the stakeholders’ perspectives and 
the DOD Decision Support System lens of cost, schedule, performance and risk to inform 
the conclusions, recommendations, and suggested areas of further research in Chapter VI.  
Table 12.   List of T-11 ATPS Issues and Concerns. Adapted from Army 
Airborne Board (2016) and Tiaden (2005). 
  
 
B. ANALYSIS CRITERIA 
This report analyzes acquisition approaches by evaluating each approach’s ability 
to meet the assigned categories of performance, cost, schedule, and risk criteria, when 
addressing the 11 issues identified in Table 12. This section defines the criteria for each 
category and provides the basis for this report’s evaluation and analysis of the acquisition 













approach to meet that criteria. An assumption made in this report, is that not all of the 
acquisition approaches will address all 11 issues; therefore, requiring an evaluation of the 
approach’s ability to meet the criteria for each issue. A category score is then given to 
each issue in that approach. The average of the individual issue category scores is 
calculated to obtain an overall category score for the approach. After each category is 
given a score, the sum of those acquisition categories will be calculated to provide an 
approach’s overall score. This overall score provides the ability to compare the four 
acquisition approaches against one another. For this report’s analysis, a higher overall 
score is more desirable and infers the most effective approach. 
1. Performance 
The criteria assigned to the performance category is the ability of an approach to 
address the issues from Table 12. The number of issues that an approach can address 
determines the score assigned to each approaches performance category. Table 13 depicts 
the score assigned to the performance category, based on the number of issues an 
approach can address. The more issues the approach addresses, the higher the score.  




The cost category criteria are defined by the total cost of an approach 
(development, testing, procurement, and fielding) for each issue in Table 12 that it can 
address. In the absence of actual cost data, this report will use an analogous estimate. 
Each approach may not address all of the issues identified, but a score is recorded based 












cost category, based on an approach’s total cost. The lower the overall total cost of an 
approach, the higher the score. 
Table 14.   Cost Scoring Criteria 
 
 
3. Schedule  
The schedule category criteria are defined by the total time it takes a solution 
from an approach to receive a requirements document approval, be developed, tested, and 
reach FUE. Depending on the approach used, a score is assigned to either each individual 
issue addressed from Table 12 and then an average is derived for the overall score, or the 
total amount of time for an approach to address all of the issues possible in Table 12. The 
scoring criteria for the schedule category is listed in Table 15. The lower the amount of 
time to field a solution(s), the higher the score. 




According to the Army Techniques Publication 5–19 Risk management, risk is 
determined by the probability or likelihood an event will occur and the consequence of 
the event in terms of injury or mission impact (United States, Training and Doctrine 
Command, 2014). Table 16 defines the levels of likelihood and consequences that are 






















Table 16.   Risk Assessment Matrix. Adapted from United States, Training and 
Doctrine Command (2014). 
 
 
The risk category criteria is defined as the ability of the acquisition approach to 
reduce the overall risk to the paratrooper compared to the current risk assessed by the 
AAB JWG in Figure 14.  
 
Figure 14.  Army Airborne Board Risk Matrix. Source: Army Airborne Board 
(2016). 
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The risk scoring criteria is listed in Table 17. If the approach and its solutions 
reduce the overall risk to a soldier, then it will receive the highest score. Figure 14 
provides the baseline risk assessment for the issues identified by the AAB prior to 
incorporating any acquisition approach and its solutions. Since not all approaches have 
the ability to address all issues, a score is recorded for each issue addressed by an 
approach and the potential solution’s impact to the current risk assessed in Figure 14. The 
average of these scores becomes the overall risk category score for an approach.  
Table 17.   Risk Scoring Criteria 
 
 
C. ANALYSIS RESULTS 
Through the use of scoring criteria assigned to the performance, cost, schedule, 
and risk categories, Table 18 provides the results of the analysis of the acquisition 
approaches and their ability to address the issues identified in Table 12.  












Performance 2 4 3
Cost 3 1 4
Schedule  3 1 4
Risk 2 2 2
Overall Score 10 8 13
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D. INCREMENTAL UPGRADE APPROACH 
1. Performance 
The Incremental upgrade or modification approach has the ability to address 4 out 
of the 11 issues identified in Table 12. Due to the number of issues that this approach 
addresses, this report assessed its performance score as a two on a scale of one to four, 
with four being the most desirable. The issues addressed by his approach include 
 T-11R inadvertent activation 
 T-11 corner crossover inversion 
 Corner vent entanglements 
 Main curve pin sensitivity 
Three possible solutions were developed to address the first issue of the T-11R 
inadvertent activation. The T-11R inserts, the first potential solution, were developed, 
tested, and fielded as an interim solution to this issue, however, its long-term effects on 
T-11R operations is unknown. Continued monitoring of the inserts is necessary to gather 
data in order to determine these impacts, but this solution has the potential become the 
long-term solution. In the meantime, two potential long-term solutions, a Collapsible 
Ripcord Grip (CRG) and a new T-11R pack tray effort are currently undergoing testing to 
assess their ability to address the inadvertent activation issue.  
The addition of a tie to the curve pin on the T-11 and MC-6 main canopy closing 
loops is an interim solution that has been tested and fielded in small numbers and could 
also become the long-term solution to the main curve pin sensitivity issue. The solutions 
for the T-11 corner crossover inversion and corner vent entanglements are still 
undergoing development and testing to assess their ability to address the issues. While 
possible solutions exist using the incremental approach for these two issues, there is the 
potential for second and third order effects. For example, the retaining band solution 
proposed to address the issue of corner crossover inversions may increase the parachute 
packing complexity. The proposed solutions by the XVIII Airborne Corps CG of 
covering the corner vents of the parachute with mesh netting or reducing the size of the 
vents to decrease the likelihood of corner vent entanglements (Army Airborne Board, 
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2016), may increase the consequence of the entanglement event or negatively impact the 
overall performance of the parachute. 
An advantage of utilizing this approach is that the four top priority issues are able 
to be addressed. Conversely, a disadvantage to the approach is that seven of the eleven 
issues identified through testing, the XVIII Airborne Corps CG memorandum and the 
AAB JWG remain unaddressed. Compared to the three other approaches analyzed in this 
report, the incremental upgrade or modification approach has the lowest performance 
score as seen in Table 18. 
2. Cost 
The cost of the incremental upgrade or approach was determined through the use 
of a combination of given program estimates and analogous cost estimate for the 
individual solutions to the issues in Table 12. The cost of those individual issue solutions 
is then summed up into a total approach cost, that includes engineering support, design 
validation, materials for testing, developmental and operational testing, procurement, and 
fielding costs.  
Table 19 shows the costs for the solutions for the individual issues addressed with 
an incremental approach along with the total cost of the approach to address the identified 
issues in the performance section of this approach (Product Manager Soldier, Clothing, 
and Individual Equipment, 2016). With an approach, total cost of $30,047,000, the 
incremental approach is assigned a score of 3. The advantage of this approach, is that the 
total cost estimate is less than the new design approach and all of the combination 
approaches. 
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Table 19.   Incremental Cost Category Scoring. Adapted from Product Manager 
Soldier, Clothing, and Individual Equipment (2016). 
 
 
The disadvantage of this approach is that the cost estimate for the corner vent 
entanglement issue is an analogous estimate based on the T-11R CRG effort with 
significantly more complexity. The cost for procurement was derived from a rebuy year’s 
parachutes, of 4,200 parachutes multiplied by the average cost per parachute, $5,757 
(Maneuver Center of Excellence, 2009). The T-11R insert solution has already been 
completed but no information was obtained regarding the cost of this effort. Therefore, an 
analogous estimate was utilized for this solution as well. The total amount for this effort 
could be more or less than the analogous estimate provided in this report. Another 
disadvantage of this approach is that the solutions being pursued now may not work, 
requiring additional design, development, testing and procurement efforts, thus increasing 
the cost to an unknown amount. With a cost estimate of $30M, the incremental approach 
only has the ability to address four of eleven issues. This must be considered when 
looking at the advantage of an incremental approach versus a new design approach. 
3. Schedule 
This section analyzes the incremental upgrade or modification approach’s time it 
takes for potential solutions to the four issues to be fielded to the first unit. Because this 
approach involves the concurrent development, testing and implementation of the four 
potential solutions each issue has an assigned schedule category score. The average of the 








Inversion Retaining band $1,013,000  $1,013,000  4
3. T‐11 Corner Vent 
Entanglement a. mesh netting $26,213,000  $26,213,000  3




category score. The four issues that are possible for this approach to address have 
schedules that vary from 7 months to 4 years. Table 20 displays the individual issues’ 
estimated schedule, its associated schedule category score, and the overall schedule 
category score for the incremental upgrade or modification approach. This approach’s 
overall schedule category score was assessed as a 3. 
Because these potential solutions are currently undergoing testing, and in the case 
of the T-11R inserts and main curve pin safety tie, are already fielded in small numbers 
the time it takes for these potential solutions to be implemented is much shorter than a 
new design. This approach also has the opportunity to address future issues as they arise. 
A disadvantage of this approach is that for each potential solution the Product Manager 
must get a Modification Work Order (MWO) or an approved Materiel Change Proposal 
(MCP) from the MCoE to obtain funding and begin the development of these solutions. 
This process can take anywhere from 30 days to one year depending on the assigned 
priority. Another disadvantage of this approach is that combat developers and PdMs must 
walk a fine line between a modification and upgrading the parachute system so much that 
it become a completely different system. The level of the modification to the design may 
also impact this approaches ability to field a potential solution quickly, requiring 
extensive testing. This is the case with the CRG solution for the T-11R inadvertent 
activation as seen in Table 20. This solution, according to the MCP submitted by PM 
SCIE (2016), requires four different test events. Additionally, if testing of these possible 
solutions uncovers second and third order effects, additional development, design, and 
test efforts must then take place, subsequently, increasing the schedule. 
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Table 20.   Incremental Schedule Scoring. Adapted from Product Manager 
Soldier, Clothing, and Individual Equipment (2016). 
 
4. Risk 
The overall risk category score for the incremental approach was assessed at a 2. 
Each potential solution to the four issues that an incremental approach could address, was 
evaluated and assigned a risk category score based on its impact to the overall risk of the 
T-11 ATPS. The risk category score for each of the four issues was added together then 
averaged to find the overall approach risk category score. Table 21 shows how the 
potential solutions for each issue could potentially impact the likelihood, consequence, 
and overall risk to the ATPS. 
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When conducting the analysis of the risk for the incremental approach, this report 
found that while the implementation of a solution may decrease the likelihood of an event 
occurring, it did not change the consequence. Because of the low ratings of likelihood, if 
the consequence does not decrease then the overall risk will not change. Risk assessments 
are very subjective based on opinions, perceptions, and interpretations. Because the T-
11R inadvertent activation has been associated with the death of a paratrooper, the 
consequence was determined to be catastrophic for this issue. Discussion could be made 
about the level of this consequence, and the fact that it does not take into consideration 
many other contributing factors such as rare gale force winds, possible faulty reserve 
packing, or a possible lack of protection of the ripcord grip. The same debate can be had 
for the level of consequence assigned to the corner crossover inversion issue. While this 
malfunction can occur, the paratrooper has a reserve that can be activated in this case. 
Additionally, the corner crossover inversion is very rare, meaning the probability is lower 
than the AAB assessment of infrequent (2016). While conducting research, no deaths 
were found to be related to crossover inversions, bringing up the question of, what is the 
actual severity of the occurrence? The only change to consequence that we found was the 
possible increase in consequence of the corner vent entanglement issue if the mesh 
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netting were to be implemented. This change in consequence to serious, did not change 
the overall risk of the ATPS. 
E. NEW DESIGN DEVELOPMENT APPROACH 
1. Performance 
The new design approach has the ability to address 10 out of the 11 issues 
identified in Table 12. Simultaneous exit is the only issue that this approach cannot 
address due to systemic center-lining issues with jumping out of high speed aircrafts. The 
performance score assessed to this approach in this analysis is four. With a new design 
approach the warfighter has the advantage of using all of their lessons learned to ensure 
that the requirements accurately reflect their needs and possible trade-offs.  
By starting with a Materiel Development Decision (MDD), a new design program 
would benefit from a thorough Analysis of Alternatives (AoA). An AoA can examine the 
possible use and/or adaptation of several existing parachute technologies. For example, 
looking at the use of the MC-6 for conventional forces, as there have been no known 
deaths associated with this steerable, static-line deployed parachute. Another possible 
solution that exists but needs more development for mass tactical airborne operations 
includes the reserve utilized with the RA-1 containing an Automatic Activation Device 
(AAD). While the AAD is included as a P3I for the current T-11 ATPS, the technology 
for its use on low-altitude low opening (LALO) jumps is not currently available and 
requires additional science and technology (S&T) development (J. Yancey, personal 
communication, December 12, 2016).  
When looking at the new design approach it is important to understand why the T-
11 ATPS began in the first place, to reduce the ROD that ultimately reduces the number 
and severity of jump related injuries. The materiel needed for a lightweight parachute 
with a large enough diameter to reduce the ROD enough to decrease jump related injuries 
requires additional S&T development. By satisfying all but one of the issues, a new 
design approach has a distinct advantage of being tied as the highest scoring approach 
with the combination approach regarding its ability to address the issues. 
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Disadvantages of the new design approach include the lack of technology 
maturity for an available solution to many of the issues identified by the airborne 
community. While a new design approach can have the advantage of being able to 
conduct research and development to mature technologies for the solutions, the 
disadvantage of is that the technology may not become mature enough for use in a new 
parachute design for mass tactical airborne operations. Trade-offs also include cost and 
time to develop the solution necessary to satisfy the requirement. Regardless of the type 
or design of the parachute, paratroopers will always experience a center-lining effect 
when conducting simultaneous door exits, especially from a C-17 (Tiaden, 2006).  
Lastly, while addressing all but one of the issues identified in Table 12 will satisfy 
the warfighter, the prospect of beginning a new parachute program to replace the T-11 
ATPS two years after reaching FOC may not be an acceptable approach to Congress 
impacting the availability of funding for a new design approach 
2. Cost 
The T-11 ATPS effort for a new canopy, reserve and troop harness had a LCCE 
of approximately $401.59M (Sloane, 2009). For the new design approach, this report 
utilizes the T-11 ATPS as an analogous estimate, thereby assigning it a cost category 
score of 1. While this approach is substantially costlier than both the incremental and 
non-materiel approaches, it has the potential to address all but one issue identified by 
testing, the XVIII Airborne Corps Commander and the AAB JWG. Another advantage is 
that performance of the parachute system is the driver for a new design approach. While 
the cost of an approach should be subject to affordability, the airborne community is able 
to get requirements and funding approved due to their ability to sell the need for the 
capability. A disadvantage of this approach is that the T-11 ATPS utilized commercially 
available parachutes, while a newly designed parachute would require extensive research 
and development of technology to accomplish its goal of addressing 10 of 11 issues 
identified in Table 12. This means that the costs to achieve this goal could be 
considerably more than the current estimate, potentially rendering it unaffordable. 
Finally, in order to receive funding for this approach, a new design program must 
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compete against other high profile programs, whose capability is seen as useful and 
effective in recent combat operations versus training exercises. 
3. Schedule 
Utilizing an analogous approach to assess the time it will take for a new design 
approach to begin fielding, this report identified a minimum of 10 years to FUE for this 
approach based on the T-11 ATPS program. The requirements process alone took the 
ATPS program 2 years to get approved and continued to evolve until 2005. The T-11 
ATPS program conducted several fly-offs while looking at commercially available 
systems starting in 2000. The program achieved FUE in 2009 after 10 years. The estimate 
of 10 years for a new design approach equates to a schedule category score of 1, which is 
the longest of the four acquisition approaches. The advantage of a new design approaches 
longer schedule is the ability to conduct research and development to mature technology, 
versus rushing potential solutions into the integration of a design and having to go back 
and fix issues.  
A disadvantage of this approach is that the requirements must be solidified before 
beginning the engineering, manufacturing, and design phase of a program. If the 
requirements continue to change then the cost and schedule associated with incorporating 
those requirements into an approved design increases exponentially. Additionally, this 
approach does not allow the XVIII Airborne Commander’s high priority issues identified 
to be addressed until the requirements process is complete which can take 2–5 years in 
itself. 
4. Risk 
When looking at the 11 issues, 6 have the potential to be eliminated with a new 
design approach. The issues that could be eliminated through the use of this approach 
include: corner vent entanglement, main curve pin sensitivity, parachute weight and size, 
deployment sequence reduction, ROD, and minimum jump altitude. While the corner 
vent entanglement issues may be eliminated, the risk of entanglements remains. Despite 
this approach’s ability to address all 11 issues and potentially eliminate 6, it does not 
reduce the ATPS’ overall risk associated with the remaining issues. This is simply 
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because a new design cannot reduce the consequence associated with a T-11R inadvertent 
activation or a crossover inversion malfunction. Therefore, the new design approach is 
assigned a risk category score of 2. 
F. NON-MATERIEL APPROACH 
1. Performance 
A non-materiel approach has the ability to address 9 out of the 11 issues identified 
in Table 12. This report identified this approaches performance score as a three. This 
approach utilizes the three main areas of doctrine, training and education, and leadership 
to address the following nine issues: 
 T-11R inadvertent activation 
 T-11 corner crossover inversion 
 T-11 corner vent entanglement 
 Main curve pin sensitivity 
 Awareness of partial and complete malfunctions 
 Reduce parachute deployment sequence 
 Reduce complexity of parachute packing procedures 
 Rate of Descent 
 Simultaneous door exits 
Following the death of a Navy Seal utilizing the MC-6 parachute and T-11R in 
2014, the issue of the inadvertent activation of the T-11R became the number one priority 
of the XVIII Airborne command. Despite this unfortunate incident, a change in doctrine 
and training of reserve packing checks, jumpmaster inspections, and paratrooper reserve 
handling awareness are capable of addressing this issue. The issue of corner cross-over 
inversions is also able to be addressed through the update of doctrine and training for 
rigger parachute packing procedures. Another advantage of this approach is the ability to 
address corner vent entanglements without changing the performance of the T-11 ATPS. 
Through the modification of exit procedures and the early identification of obstacles in 
airborne training, corner vent entanglements can be addressed, but not eliminated. The 
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main curve pin sensitivity can also be addressed through doctrine and training for riggers; 
rotating parachutes in the pack sheds, training and inspection emphasis for jumpmasters 
on the correct location of the curved pin. The only way that the issue of awareness of 
partial and complete malfunctions can be addressed is through the training of the 
paratroopers beginning in the basic airborne course and continuing this training during 
rehearsals and refresher training. This issue also includes the effort of leadership to 
reduce the negative stigma associated with activating or pulling the reserve parachute. 
PdM SCIE and NSRDEC conducted studies and found that the T-11 ATPS actually has 
the same amount of lift at 4 seconds as the T-10 parachute (Duncan, 2016). Paratrooper 
training and awareness of this fact, along with experience will instill confidence in the T-
11 ATPS. Currently, the PdM along with the QMS are testing different types of folding 
techniques that attempt to address the issue of reducing the complexity of parachute 
packing procedures. While this issue was identified during OT with the average packing 
time of 21 minutes versus the APA requirement of 17 minutes, the learning curve 
indicated that the average pack time would decrease (U.S. Army Evaluation Center, 
2009). Another advantage of this approach is the ability of doctrine to set a maximum 
weight limit on combat equipment carried on the paratrooper to address the ROD issue. 
While the T-11 ATPS ROD KPP threshold of 18 fps was not met by the 95th percentile 
male, its average ROD of 19.1 fps was accepted by the XVIII Airborne Corps and the 
combat developer following OT in 2008. Lastly, the XVIII Airborne Corps has the ability 
to change their TTPs regarding simultaneous exits to reduce the impact of center-lining to 
parachute entanglements and collisions. 
Other advantages of utilizing a non-materiel approach to address these nine issues 
includes a shorter amount of time to implementation and a reduced sticker price. This 
approach allows different users to tailor their doctrine, training, and TTPs to meet their 
mission. A disadvantage of the non-materiel approach is the inability of this approach to 
address the two issues of reduce parachute size and weight and minimum jump altitude. 
Disadvantages such as the persistent perception of many paratroopers (leaders and 
privates) that materiel solutions are the only adequate way to address parachute issues 
and an unwillingness of the leadership to significantly modify doctrine and TTPs to 
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address simultaneous exits and ROD issues also exist. Finally, the most notable 
disadvantage of a non-materiel approach is that even with the change in doctrine, 
education and training, and leadership, human error can still play a significant role in the 
performance of the parachute due to their ability to make decisions/choices despite the 
implementation of these items 
2. Cost 
The costs of the non-materiel approach’s ability to address the issues listed in 
Table 12, were inconsequential when compared to the three other approaches. The update 
of training manuals and points of instruction at the BAC, refresher training, and 
rehearsals was estimated at approximately $10,000 per issue addressed. This amount is an 
analogous estimate from PdM SCIE’s Materiel change proposal (2016), estimating the 
update to technical drawings for the corner vent crossover inversion issue. With the non-
materiel approach addressing 9 out of 11 issues, multiplied by $10,000 per issue, the 
overall non-materiel approach cost is approximately $90,000. This estimate corresponds 
to the cost category score of 4. As the least expensive approach compared to the other 
three, the costs associated with the non-materiel approach can be further reduced if the 
doctrine, training and education, and leadership changes are implemented together versus 
separately. Because BAC, refresher training, and rehearsals are continuous efforts with 
available funding, it is difficult to determine if the true cost of these updates. 
3. Schedule 
Modification or updates to training and technical manuals, POIs, or TTPs requires 
approximately 6 months to 1 year to complete which is the least amount of time to 
implementation when compared to the other approaches. With the non-materiel 
approach’s ability to reach implementation within 1 year, a score of four was assessed to 
this approach’s schedule category. One of the key advantages regarding an approaches 
schedule to implementation, is that it is normally a routine action, wherein lessons 
learned are applied and documented on a regular basis. Secondly, the issues that are able 
to be addressed utilizing this approach can be addressed utilizing training, rehearsals and 
other means that already exist.  
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A major disadvantage of this approach is that personnel who update the manuals, 
POIs or TTPs must receive approval from the Training and Doctrine Command 
(TRADOC), when it impacts conventional forces within the military. Depending on the 
supporting personnel at this command, the approval process of these changes can 
increase the amount of time to this approach’s ability to get to implementation. Another 
disadvantage of this approach is that the implementation of the doctrine, training and 
education, and leadership may not fully address an issue listed in Table 12. This requires 
additional efforts to address the issues, ultimately increasing the schedule.  
4. Risk 
No matter how much doctrine, training, education and leadership is applied to 
address the 11 issues in Table 12, the risks associated with these issues and the overall 
risk of the T-11 ATPS remain the same. The risk category score of 2 is given to the non-
materiel approach, as a result. A thought to ponder is the ability of training to change the 
perception or interpretation of the level of consequence associated with these issues. This 
possible variable means that the overall risk of the T-11 ATPS and the 11 issues could 
increase or decrease.  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND AREAS FOR 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
A. CONCLUSION 
The overall scoring of the four different approaches suggests that the non-materiel 
approach addresses the most number of issues, in the shortest amount of time, and with 
the lowest cost. Additionally, scoring showed that a new design approach can address a 
majority of the issues but it will take a significant amount of time and money before a 
solution is delivered. The incremental upgrade approach provides the ability to address 
higher priority issues with a technologically available, materiel solution in a shorter 
period of time and at a reduced cost compared to a new design. Qualitative information 
obtained through this report differs from the quantitative results, pointing to a 
combination of the approaches as potentially the most appropriate. Ultimately, leaders 
must assign weights to the different categories of performance, cost, schedule, and risk to 
account for the tradeoffs that they are willing to accept. 
Four possible combinations of the approaches exist, with each having its own 
advantages and disadvantages. Tables 22 and 23 show the cost and schedule estimates for 
the possible combination approaches. The estimated costs in Table 22 were calculated by 
combining the total cost of each approach within the combination. The analogous 
schedule estimates in Table 23 show the potential timeframes for each combination 
approach. Solutions to issues would be fielded within these timeframes.  
Table 22.   Acquisition Approach Combination Costs. Adapted from Product 









Table 23.   Acquisition Approach Combination Schedules 
 
 
The first combination of approaches, incremental and new design, addresses all 
but two of the issues using a materiel solution; they are increasing the awareness of 
partial and complete malfunctions and simultaneous door exits. This approach would 
satisfy the XVIII Airborne Corps’ intent of finding solutions to their top priorities as soon 
as the technological solution is available, while continuing to develop the requirements 
documents and technology necessary to address the remaining issues. Another advantage 
of this approach is that the interim solutions developed from an incremental approach 
could be utilized in the new design, with the recommendation by the AoA. The 
disadvantage of this approach is that it requires a significant amount of money and 
depending on the issue, time, to address the applicable issues.  
The second combination of incremental and non-materiel approaches only 
addresses 9 out of the 11 issues; leaving the minimum jump altitude and parachute size 
and weight issues remaining. This combination approach is currently being pursued by 
the PdM, XVIII Airborne Corps, and Combat Developer to provide both short-term and 
long term solutions to the issues while maintaining the positive features of the T-11 
ATPS. The advantage of this approach is that it provides both materiel and non-materiel 
solutions to issues at the lowest cost, and in the shortest amount of time among the 
possible combinations. This approach also allows the airborne community to continue to 
utilize the T-11 ATPS, while gaining experience, familiarity, and possibly more 
confidence in the system that was already developed and fielded. 
Combining the new design and non-materiel approaches addresses all of the 11 
issues in Table 12 by providing a short-term solution utilizing the non-materiel approach 
and a long-term materiel solution through a new design approach. This combination 
allows the required technology to develop and mature, to meet a new design’s validated 
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requirements. The disadvantage of this approach is that it does not meet the XVIII 
Airborne Corps’ intent of implementing possible materiel solutions as fast as possible for 
the top priority issues. Another disadvantage of this approach is that it does not address 
the minimum jump altitude and size and weight issues. These issues may not be 
showstoppers for the airborne community due to the T-11 ATPS meeting the weight KPP 
and receiving formal acceptance of the higher minimum jump altitude by the user. 
Additionally, the size and weight of a parachute may not be as critical due to the lack of 
recent airborne operations covering long distances. 
A combination of all three approaches, could be the best approach when 
addressing all of the issues in Table 12. Possibly providing a near-term solution 
addressing the issues through doctrine, training, education, and leadership; a mid-term 
materiel solution for the four top priority concerns of the XVIII Airborne Corps and the 
AAB JW; a long-term materiel solution pursuing the development of the science and 
technology needed to address many other issues listed in Table 12 but not addressed by 
the incremental approach. The scope of the incremental and new design approaches can 
be tailored to meet cost and schedule boundaries set by the AAB. This combination 
addresses all of the stakeholder concerns. The disadvantage of this approach is the 
potential for the cost and schedule to grow without boundaries being set. Another 
disadvantage is that the leadership within the XVIII Airborne Corps and the AAB may 
change and the priorities assigned to the issues that should drive the level of effort in each 
of these combinations may be required to change. 
An important item discovered during the research for this report is that there is no 
surprise regarding the risk associated with Airborne operations; however, our society and 
culture make even the slightest bit of risk intolerable. Leaders can mitigate most of the 
risk through the proper use of doctrine, training, education, and leadership. This report 
found that no one approach will completely reduce or eliminate the overall risk of 
airborne operations, unless the perceptions of the consequences change. The current 
perception is that the issues faced by the airborne community are due to the parachute 
and its supporting equipment, even though data from many different studies and 
investigations suggest otherwise. The death of a paratrooper makes leaders, families, and 
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society question a pure non-materiel approach, because of the question: What more could 
have been done to prevent this tragedy? This leads the DOD down a path of a materiel 
approach, despite the analysis showing that it does not resolve or lower the overall risk of 
the ATPS.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS  
The objective of the research report was to provide options for a path forward for 
the U.S. Army’s T-11 Advanced Tactical Parachute System (ATPS). To provide the most 
effective troop parachute system for use in military airborne operations a combination of 
all three acquisition approaches is recommended. A near-term, mid-term, and long-term 
strategy for implementing the approaches should be used to address all of the issues 
identified in Table 12. As part of a near-term strategy, the airborne community should 
immediately incorporate lessons learned into doctrine, training, education, and leadership 
to mitigate several risks until potential materiel solutions are developed and fielded. 
Secondly, the solutions that have been developed, tested, and fielded in small quantities 
through the incremental approach, such as the T-11R inserts and main curve pin tie, 
should be fielded to the rest of the airborne units, as soon as possible, under a MWO. As 
a part of the mid-term strategy, these modifications should then be monitored for 
potential second and third order effects to airborne operations. Additionally, test and 
evaluation activities should continue to assess the effectiveness of solutions such as the 
T-11R CRG, pack tray, retaining band. These potential modifications would be 
designated as the T-11A. Additionally, it is recommended that the T-11 corner vent 
entanglement issue be closed out under the mid-term strategy and included as a part of 
the long-term strategy developing the requirements for a T-11B. Following the 
development and validation of the requirements, it is recommended that the use of the 
MC-6 in mass tactical airborne operations and the RA-1 reserve parachute be considered 
during a thorough AoA. Concurrently, research and development should be conducted to 
mature science and technology regarding lightweight parachute material and the use of an 
AAD for low-altitude low-opening jumps. In order to pursue these strategies, it is 
imperative to establish a priority of effort and resources, with money and personnel being 
allocated to the development of parachute along with conducting research and 
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development of solutions for the higher risk issues. Figure 15 provides an example 
parallel schedule for the near, mid, and long-term efforts. 
 
Figure 15.  Example Parallel Approach Schedule. Adapted from Product Manager 
Soldier, Clothing, and Individual Equipment (2016). 
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
1. Conduct CBA on T-11 ATPS Acquisition Approaches 
The report conducted a qualitative analysis on the T-11 ATPS by identifying the 
advantages and disadvantages of each acquisition approach option. A formal cost benefit 
analysis would serve to validate or show the lack of cost effectiveness when addressing 
issues.  
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2. Use of Mass Tactical Jumps in Today’s Military Operations 
Based on the results of the research, it was identified that there is a considerable 
amount of time and resources spent on the development of equipment and training for 
airborne operations. As history shows, the Army’s use of tactical parachutes during mass 
tactical combat airborne operations has declined since WWII. Research should be 
conducted to determine if the use of mass tactical parachute operations is still relevant in 
today’s military operating environment; given its inherently risky nature, in a risk adverse 
society. 
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